The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution: Should the Bill of Rights Be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences? by King, Robert H., Jr.
The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution:
Should the Bill of Rights Be Transformed into the
Bill of Preferences?
ROBERT H. KING, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A divided Supreme Court recently held in Maryland v. Craig,1 that the
Sixth Amendment's unambiguous command that "the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him"2 reflects a mere
"preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial"3  which can be
countermanded when "necessary to further an important public policy
and... where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 4 The
"public policy" identified by the Craig Court was the State's interest in "the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims." Because this
"public policy" was deemed sufficiently important, and because the reliability
of testimony taken via one-way closed circuit television was purportedly
"otherwise assured," the child could testify outside the presence of the
defendant.5
* A.B., Dartmouth College, Magna Cum Laude, 1975; ID, University of Michigan
Law School, Magna Cum Laude 1978. Admitted to practice in Illinois (1978) and
California (1988). Partner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, San Francisco office. This
Article is based upon a presentation made to the faculty of South Texas School of Law,
Houston, Texas, January 23, 1991. The author wishes to express his appreciation for
suggestions made by members of the faculty during the presentation. The author also wishes
to express his appreciation to Maria Cristina Gutierrez, Esq., one of the counsel of record
for the respondent in Maryland v. Craig, for providing access to the Craig record and briefs
before the Supreme Court, and to Ofer Sharone, a student at Harvard Law School for his
research assistance.1 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165.
4 Id. at 3166. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion, in which Justices
Rehnquist, White, Blackmun and Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia dissented, and was joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
5 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170. In another 5-4 decision issued on the same day as Craig,
the Court upheld the Idaho Supreme Court's determination that the admission of inculpatory
hearsay testimony under Idaho's "catch-all" hearsay exception patterned after Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(24) violated the defendant's federal right to confrontation because the
testimony lacked sufficient "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
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The Craig decision is a radical departure from the Supreme Court's
pronouncement only two years earlier in Coy v. Iowa6 that "the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witness
appearing before the trier of fact." 7 The transformation of the Confrontation
Clause's explicit "guarantee" into a mere "preference" in the name of social
policy could lead to the virtual elimination of the right to confrontation.
Presumably the State has an equally important interest in protecting the
traumatized rape victim, the elderly assault victim, or the victim of gang
violence. If the Bill of Rights is transformed into the "Bill of Preferences," all
of the defendant's "preferences"-from the "preference" for jury trial to the
"preference" for counsel-may be ignored if the State's interest is deemed
sufficiently "important."
This Article will review the development of the laws enacted to protect the
child witness and examine the Supreme Court's responses to such legislation in
Coy and Craig. This Article will demonstrate that the Court's decision in Craig
was predicated upon a misunderstanding of the Court's prior Confrontation
Clause cases, and that the Court used a new and improper constitutional test to
abrogate the defendant's face-to-face confrontation rights and then misapplied
the new test it created. Although the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation may not be absolute if examined in the abstract, when the entire
constellation of trial rights affected by the child witness procedures are
considered and the appropriate test is applied, it becomes evident that such
procedures will rarely pass constitutional muster.
II. THE MOLESTED CHILD WITNESs: THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Child Molestation: An Increasing Problem
Reports of child molestation and abuse have increased dramatically over
the past fifteen years. From 1976 until 1985, annual reports of child
The Court rejected the State's argument that independent evidence corroborating the truth
of a hearsay statement may properly support a finding that the statement bears
"'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Instead, the Court held that "[to be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant
must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference
to other evidence at trial." Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. Interestingly, the Craig minority,
along with Justice O'Connor, who authored the Craig majority opinion, became the Wright
majority. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist, White and Blackmun, dissented.
6 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
7 Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
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mistreatment increased nearly three-fold from 669,000 to over 1.9 million.8
"The molestation of children has now reached epidemic proportions. Even by
conservative estimates, a young American will be sexually molested once every
two minutes." 9 Unfortunately, false reports of molestation have also occurred,
and such accusations are becoming alarmingly frequent in divorce and child
custody cases. 10
Child molestation is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute
because often the only witness is the child victim.II Studies suggest that a child
victimized by abuse is traumatized further when required to testify during the
prosecution of the alleged molester. 12 In a 1974 study, eighty-four percent of
8 THE AMEmCAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECING CHILDREN, HIGHUGHTS OF
OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECt AND ABUSE REPORTING, 1985, 3, 18 (1987); see also,
AMmECAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GuiDELqs FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF CHILD
WITNEsSES IN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE IS ALLEGED, 7 (1985) (indicating that as
many as one in every three female adults was sexually abused as a child); DAVID
FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, 1-2 (1984); Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive
Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745,
1745 n.1 (1983).
9 Child Sexual Abuse Victims in the Courts: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Juvenile Justice of the Senate Committee on the Judiiary, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 77 (1984)
(opening statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, R. Pa., Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Juvenile Justice).
10 See the description of the Jordan, Minnesota debacle in Justice Scalia's dissent in
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3175-76 (1990); see also, 2 Acquitted of Child
Molestation in Nation's Longest Criminal Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990 at A18
(documenting the 33-month, $15 million jury trial of the McMartins in Los Angles which
resulted in acquittal of the defendants); Thomas L. Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim,
The Rules of Evidence, and the Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not
Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 228-29 n.13 (1987) (noting that by some estimates, sixty
to seventy percent of reported cases are unfounded); Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse
Trials and the Confrontation of Traunatized Witnesses: Defining 'Confrontation' to Protect
Both Chidren and Defendants, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185 n.2-3 (1991).
Accusations of child abuse in divorce and child custody cases are now often made in an
effort to alter the balance of power between the parties. EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD
PSYCHIATRY AND THELAW (Diane H. Schetky et al eds., Brunner/Mazel, Inc. 1985).
11 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
12 Gail S. Goodman et al., The Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on
Child Sexual Assault Victims: A Preliminary Report, in THE CHILD WrrNESS: DO THE
COURTS ABUSE CHILDREN?, AT 46, 48-53 (Graham Davies & Jonquil Drinkwater eds.,
1988); Gail S. Goodman, The Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims of
Tesifying in Criminal Court, Final Report to the National Institute of Justice (U.S. Dept. of
Justice 1989); see also, Beth Bjerregaard, Televised Testimony as an Alternative in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 164, 169-71 (1989); Ellen Foreman, Note, To
Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 439 (1989);
Paula E. ill & Samuel M. Hill, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, 85
1992]
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the judges surveyed believed that children who testified in court in sexual abuse
cases were traumatized as a result. 13 Many child abuse cases are not prosecuted
"as a result of problems attending the testimony of children who could not deal
with the prospect of facing fathers, step-fathers, relatives and strangers in a
courtroom setting." 14 It has been suggested that requiring the child to confront
the alleged molester is particularly frightening, and can produce a condition in
which the child simply cannot speak of the incident. 15 In recognition of the
ordeal that a trial would entail, many parents simply refuse to prosecute. 16 As
of 1986, it had been "estimated that only 24% of all cases [of child
molestation] nationwide result[ed] in criminal actions." 17
B. Proposed Legislative Solutions
In response to the rise in reported instances of sexual abuse of children and
to the problems associated with the molested child witness, several states
enacted laws designed to lessen the effect on children of participation in sexual
molestation prosecutions. These laws have taken essentially three forms: use of
closed circuit television to take the child's testimony, use of videotape
depositions to present the child's testimony, and special child hearsay
exceptions which permit parents or doctors to testify as to what they were told
by the child.
At the time that most of these statutes were enacted, it was the prevailing
understanding that the Supreme Court had established a "general approach" in
MIcH. L. REv. 809, 819-21 (1987); Jacqueline Y. Parker, The Rights of Child Wiesses.
Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 648-53 (1982);
Catherine M. Mahady-Smith, Note, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution:
Another Form of Abuse?, 89 DICK. L. REV. 721, 732 (1985).
13 Rob Lusk & Jill Waterman, Effects of Sexual Abuse on Children, in SEXUAL ABUSE
OF YOUNG CHILDREN 101, 109 (1986).
14 State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 (N.J. Sup. 1984) (as many as 90% of the
child abuse cases in one prosecutor's office dismissed due to reluctance of child to testify);
see also, Smith, supra note 12, at 721-22.
15 Hill & Hill, supra note 12, at 827; see also, Maim H. Bainor, The Constitutionality
of the Use of Two-Way aosed ircuit Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex
Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995, 1017 (1985); LEROY G. SCHULTZ, ED., THE SEXUAL
VIcrIMOLOGY OF YoUrH 195 (1980). But see text accompanying notes 221-35 infra
(pointing out that the scientific study of the effects of courtroom procedures is in its infancy,
and the ability to isolate the impact of the presence of the defendant-as opposed to other
factors, such as testifying in public, being subject to cross-examination, etc.,-is highly
suspect).
16 Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative
Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 807 (1985).
17 Demetra John McBride, Sexually Abused Children: The Best Kept Legal Secret, 3
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 441, 446 (1986).
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Ohio v. Roberts18 for determining when hearsay would be admissible under the
Confrontation Clause. First, "the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailiability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to
use against the defendant." 19 Second, "the Clause countenances only hearsay
marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule.'" 20 "Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 21 Most
of the legislative devices attempted, to a greater or lesser degree, to come
within the Roberts "general approach." 22
18 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). But see infra note 159 which demonstrates that this
"general approach" is nothing more than dicta and is not fully supported by the Court's
prior Confrontation Clause cases.
19 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
2 0 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
21 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
22 There was, however, some question as to whether the Roberts "general approach"
was anything more than the "'Sistine Chapel' of obiter dicta." People v. White, 555 N.E.2d
1241, 1252 (111. App. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1681 (1991). In White, the defendant
was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential burglary, and unlawful
restraint. The evidence presented at trial consisted solely of the out-of-court declarations of
a four-year-old child who, although present in the courtroom during the trial, did not testify,
nor was there any showing that she was unable to testify. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 3-4. People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241 (M1. App. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1681
(1991). Instead, the prosecution introduced the testimony of five witnesses (the child's
babysitter, mother, a police officer, an emergency room nurse and a treating physician)
who were permitted to testify as to statements made to them by the child under Illinois'
"spontaneous declaration" (excited utterance) exception and the statements made for the
purpose of medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. White, 555 N.E.2d at 1246-51.
Like the comparable Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) and 803(4), these Illinois hearsay
exceptions did not require that the declarant be "unavailable."
The Illinois Appellate Court ruled (before Craig and Wright were decided) that the
Roberts "general approach" was merely dicta which had been subsequently restricted to its
facts by the Court's decisions in two cases which indicated that neither unavailability nor a
particularized showing of reliability was required for the admission of co-conspirator
testimony. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Boujaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987). The Illinois Appellate Court held that the question of unavailability "is
totally irrelevant to the determination of whether an out-of-court statement of that declarant
is admissible under an exception or exemption to the hearsay rule." WIte, 555 N.E.2d at
1252. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to presumably clarify whether a showing of
unavailability is constitutionally mandated. Although the Court in Idaho v. Wright, applied
the Roberts "general approach," this question was left unresolved: Wright did "not raise the
question whether, before a child's out-of-court statements are admitted, the Confrontation
Clause requires the prosecution to show that a child witness is unavailable-and, if so, what
the showing requires" because "[t]he trial court in this case found that respondent's younger
daughter was incapable of communicating with the jury, and the defense counsel agreed."
19921
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1. One-Way or Two-Way Closed Circuit Television
Thirty-two states have authorized the use of either one-way23 or two-way24
closed circuit television testimony in child abuse cases. The majority of closed
circuit statutes permit the broadcasting only of the testimony of child victims,
but some allow the broadcasting of testimony of other children as well. 25 Age
qualifications of the child witness vary, with some statutes limiting their
application to children ten years old or less,26 while others allow their
application to children as old as eighteen.27 The standards which must be
satisfied to invoke the closed circuit procedure range from no standards at all, 28
Idaho v. Wright, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 155-88
(concerning an alternative understanding of the Court's prior Confrontation Clause cases).
See also infra notes 173 and 183 (which examine the continuing viability of the Roberts
dicta).
23 ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (1988); ARIZ. REV.
SEAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989); ILL. REV. SEAT. ch.
38, para. 106A-3 (1989); IND. CODE § 35-374-8 (1988); IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-350(1),(3)
(Baldwin Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (1990); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, § 16D (1991); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(4) (1992); Mss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); NJ. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 753(B) (Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 40.460(24) (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5985 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.017, § 3 (West Supp. 1990);
UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 807(d).
24 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1991); HAW. R. EVID. 616; IDAHO CODE § 19-
3024A (Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4)(c)(2) (1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.41(C),(E)
(Baldwin 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (1991); VT. R. EvID. 807(e). In a two-way
closed circuit television system the child can see the courtroom and the defendant on a video
monitor while the jury, judge and the defendant are able to view the child on another
monitor during the testimony.
25 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (1988); AIuZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 278 § 16D (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (1989); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42 § 5985 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (1989).
26 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8
(1989); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1988).
27 See, e.g., ALA. CODE 15-25-3 (1988) (under age 16); FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (1989)
(under age 16); HAW. R. EVID. 616 (under age 18); MD. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5-701(d)
(1989 Supp.) (under age 16); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32.4 (1989) (under age 16).
28 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (1991); HAW. R. EVID. 616; IOVA
CODE § 910A.14 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22 § 753 (1989).
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to generalized requirements that "good cause [be] shown," 29 or that "justice so
requires," 30 or that it be "in the best interests of the child." 31 Some states
even require detailed findings which must be made (usually on the record)
focusing upon the emotional trauma that in-court testimony would produce.
32
2. Videotape Testimony
Thirty-seven states have enacted laws to permit the use of videotaped
testimony of sexually abused children.33 Some states admit the videotape of a
29 ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1988); PA. CONS. SAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 5985 (1991).
30 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (1991).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 106A-3 (1989).
32 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West 1991) (impact of in court
testimony so substantial "as to make the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed-circuit
television is used"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1989) (child so "intimidated or
otherwise inhibited, by the physical presence of the defendant that a compelling need exits"
to use procedure); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(1) (1989) ("there is a substantial likelihood that the
child will suffer at least moderate emotional or mental harm if required to testify in open
court"); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (1991) (testifying in court will cause "serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-374-
8(e)(1)(B)(ih) (1991) ("more likely than not that the child's testifying in the courtroom
would be a traumatic experience"); MD. CODE ANN. CrS. & Juc. PROC. § 9-102 (1990)
("serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate"); MASS.
GEN L. ANN. ch. 278:16 D(b)(1) (1991) (child witness must be "likely to suffer
psychological or emotional trauma"); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4)(c) (1992) (testifying in
presence of defendant would "psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the
witness unavailable to testify"); NJ. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (1991) ("a substantial
likelihood that the witness would suffer severe emotional or mental distress if required to
testify in open court"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Baldwin 1991) ("serious
emotional trauma" from testifying in open court); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.9 (1991) (child
unavailable to testify due to "severe emotional trauma from testifying"); VT. R. EVID.
807(c) (showing that "requiring the child to testify in court will present a substantial risk of
trauma to the child which would substantially impair the ability of the child to testify").
33 ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251, 4253(B),(C)
(1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86(g)
(1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1989); HAW. R.
EVID. 616; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (1989); IND. CODE §§ 35-37-4-
8(c),(d),(f),(g) (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1989); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 278, § 16D (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2163a(5) (Supp. 1990); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(4) (1992); MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 491.675-491.690 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 174.227 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-17 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.41(A),(B),(D),(E) (Baldwin 1991);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 753(c) (Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1989); 42 PA.
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child's initial interview by law enforcement officials or social workers as
substantive evidence, even though not taken in the defendant's presence or
subject to cross-examination, provided the child testifies at the trial. 34 Some of
the state videotaping statutes provide for taping child testimony at preliminary
hearings or at pretrial depositions. 35 To be admissible, a majority of the states
require that the defendant have a full opportunity to cross-examine the child
during the deposition or hearing.36 Several states require that the defendant be
present at the time of the videotaping.37 Others, however, contain some
provision for keeping the defendant from seeing the child during the
testimony.38 The majority of statutes condition admissibility of the videotape
testimony upon a finding that the child is "unavailable" to testify because live
testimony would cause emotional trauma. 39
CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-7-116(d),(e),(f) (Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.071, § 4 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH R. CRIM. PROc. 15.5; VT. R. EvID. 807(d); Wis.
STAT. §§ 967.04(7)-967.04(10) (1991); WYo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
34 See DEBRA WHrrCOMB, Er AL., WHEN THE VICrIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FOR
JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 59-68 (1985). The major reasons for videotaping the child's
inital interview are: "(1) to reduce the possibility of the child's memory fading over time;
(2) to reduce the number of interviews the child must give; (3) to preclude the child from
testifying in front of the grand jury; and (4) to prevent the possibility of the child retracting
his story because of pressures from family or friends." John A. Stephen, Note, Preserving
the Cld Sexual Abuse Victim's Testimony: Videotaping Is Not The Answer, 1987 DEr.
C.L. REV. 469, 482.
35 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134251, 4253(B),(C) (1991); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1991); FLA.
STAT. § 92.53 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, P.106A-2 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1558 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(A),(B),(D),(E) (Baldwin 1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN., art. 38.071, § 4
(1991); VT. R. EVID. 807(d); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)-(10) (1991).
36 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.227 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41(A) (Baldwin 1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); TEX. CODE CiUM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (1991).
37 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 4253(B), (C) (1991); FLA. STAT.
§ 92.53 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 106A-2 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1558 (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2
(Supp. 1989); VT. R. EvID. 807(d).
38 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3511 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 92.53 (1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5982, 5984 (1988); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 807(d).
39 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (1991); FLA. STAT. § 92.53
(1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A),(B),(D),(E) (Baldwin 1991); R.I. GEN.
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3. Special Child Hearsay Exceptions
Twenty states have enacted rules or statutes carving out a separate hearsay
exception for child victims of, or witnesses to, physical or sexual abuse in
various circumstances. 40 Some of the statutes require, in apparent deference to
the Roberts "general approach," that the child be unavailable to testify. 41
Others allow any reliable out-of-court statement to be admitted regardless of
availability. 42 Some statutes admit such out-of-court statements only if the child
appears at trial and testifies. 43 Most statutes require a finding that the out-of-
court statement is reliable.44
4. Pre-Coy Judicial Treatment of the Child Witness Statutes
The constitutionality of some of these procedures was upheld by state
courts, 45 while others were struck down as infringing upon the defendant's
LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EvID. 807(d); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.,
art. 38.071, § 4 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (7)-(10) (1991).
40 ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1991);
ARK. R. EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
25-129 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 802-
18(4)(c) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-15-4, 35-37-4-6 (1991); IOWA CODE § 232.96(6)
(1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1991); MINN. STAT. § 260.156 (1992); Mo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 491.075 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.385 (1991); 12 OKLA. STAT.
§ 2803.1 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-68 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-
38 (1991); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 38.072 (West 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
411 (West 1991); VT. R. EVID. 803(24); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1991).
41 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1991); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (1987).
42 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251, 134253(B), (C) (1991); ARK. R. EVID.
803(25); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-129 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23)
(1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-374-6 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. § 260.156 (1992); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491.075 (1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.385 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2803.1 (1992); S.D. CODIMD LAWS § 19-
16-38 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120
(1991). These statutes require corroborating evidence for admissibility if the child is
unavailable to testify.
43 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 38-072 (West 1991); VT. R. EVID. 803(24).
See also Lynn McLain, Maryland's Statutory Hearsay Exception for Reliable Statements by
Alleged C7ld Abuse Victrms: A Hesitant Step Forward, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 17 n.66
(1987).
44 See WHTrcOMB, supra note 34.
45 See, e.g., State v. Melendez, 661 P.2d 654 (Ariz. App. 1982); McGuire v. State,
706 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1986); People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo. App. 1985);
Chambers v. State, 504 So.2d 476 (Fla. App. 1987); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212
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Sixth Amendment rights.46 This divergence of view set the stage for the
Court's first direct encounter with the molested child witness statutes in Coy v.
Iowa.
III. THE COURT'S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH CHILD WITNESS
PROTECrION STATUTES: COY V. IOWA STRIKES DOWN THE USE OF A
SCREENING DEVICE
A. Background
Coy v. Iowa47 involved the sexual assault of two thirteen-year-old girls by
a man who entered their tent where they had been sleeping. The tent was
located in the backyard of the home where one of the girls lived and next door
to the house where the defendant resided. Neither girl ever identified the
defendant as her assailant. 48
Seven days before the trial was to begin, the State filed a motion pursuant
to Iowa Code Section 910A.3 to have the testimony of the victims taken outside
the courtroom and televised by closed circuit television, or alternatively that the
defendant be confined behind a screen or mirror that would permit him to see
and hear the girls but would not allow the witnesses to see the defendant. 4 9 The
(Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); Altmeyer v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind.
App. 1986); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987); State v. Johnson, 729 P.2d 1169
(Kan. 1986); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); State v Guidroz, 498
So.2d 108 (La. App. 1986); State v. Feazell, 486 So.2d 327 (La. App. 1986); State v.
Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. App. 1986); In re Welfare of M.S.M., 387 N.W.2d 194
(Minn. App. 1984); State v. Rogers, 692 P.2d 2 (Mont. 1984); State v. Heath, 523 A.2d 82
(N.H. 1986); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (NJ. 1984); State v. Tafoya, 765 P.2d
1183 (N.M. App. 1988); State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1987).
46 Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988) (decided on state
constitutional grounds); State v. Murphy, 375 S.E.2d 405 (W.Va. 1988).
47 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
4 8 Joint Appendix at 7, 14, 20, 32, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757).
Both girls gave statements and later testified at a discovery deposition and at trial that they
could not identify their assailant, but described him as a muscular man of tall or medium
height, wearing a short ponytail. Id. at 20, 31, 32-33, 35, 45. One of the girls testified that
the man wore a green mask or make-up, and both girls recalled that he wore a watch with a
traditional clock face. Id. at 31, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44. At trial, the defendant offered
unrefuted evidence that he always wore his hair short and never in a ponytail, that he was
six foot three and wore a digital watch. Id. at 64-67. See also Brief for the Appellant at 2-
3, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (No. 86-6757).
49 Brief for the Appellant at 2-3, Coy (No. 86-6757). Iowa Code 910A.3 was
transferred in the 1987 Iowa Code to section 910A. 14, which provides in pertinent part:
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State's motion did not set forth any justification for invoking these procedures.
The defense objected, arguing that since the girls were unable to identify the
defendant as their assailant, testifying in his presence would not be traumatizing
for them.50 The defense also argued that the proposed screening device implied
that the defendant was guilty, infringed on his right to confront witnesses
against him, and denied him a fair trial. 51 The trial court overruled defendant's
objections, denied the State's request to take the testimony outside the
courtroom, but ordered that a one-way screening structure be erected in the
courtroom.5 2 The defendant was convicted and appealed.
B. The Iowa Supreme Court Decision
The Iowa Supreme Court held that the use of the screening device did not
offend the Confrontation Clause. The court rejected the notion that the purpose
1. A court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, order that the
testimony of a child as defined in section 702.5 be taken in a room other than the
courtroom and be televised by closed circuit equipment in the courtroom to be viewed
by the court. Only the judge, parties, counsel, persons necessary to operate the
equipment, and any person whose presence, in the opinion of the court, would
contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child may be present in the room with
the child during the child's testimony.
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen
or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's* testimony,
but does not allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so confined,
the court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can confer during the
testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear the child during
testimony.
A 1989 amendment deleted the second paragraph. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1991).
50 Joint Appendix at 6-7, 8, 12-13, Coy (No. 86-6757).
51 Id. at5, 8-13.
52 Justice Scalia's opinion characterized the screening device as follows: "After certain
lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the screen would enable appellant dimly to perceive
the witnesses, but the witnesses to see him not at all." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014. Not
surprisingly, the appellant's characterization is far less benign:
Following opening statements, the judge instructed the bailiff to turn off the courtroom
lights and close the window blinds. With the courtroom in near total darkness, a
screening barrier [over six feet high and four feet wide] was positioned directly in front
of appellant at counsel table. The barrier was then illuminated by a panel of four
spotlights. Into that "eerie" atmosphere two thirteen-year-old girls were ushered, one at
a time, through a special entrance to provide critical testimony as the state's first and
primary witnesses against appellant.
Reply Brief for the Appellant at 1, Coy (No. 86-6757) (citations omitted).
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of the Confrontation Clause was to require that the defendant be allowed the
privilege of idly gazing upon all witnesses. Rather, the court held that the
Confrontation Clause serves to insure that (1) witnesses will testify in court in
full view of the court and jury so that their demeanor may be judged; (2) the
testimony will be under oath to enhance its reliability; and (3) the witnesses
will be subject to full cross-examination. Since it was clear that the girls'
testimony was given in full view of the court and jury, under oath and subject
to cross-examination, the Iowa Supreme Court found no Confrontation Clause
violation.53
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
By a vote of 6-2, the Supreme Court reversed.54 Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, traced the lineage of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation right
"to the beginnings of Western legal culture," 55 although he acknowledged that
its language "comes to us on faded parchment." 56 Justice Scalia observed that
53 State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Iowa 1986). The Iowa Supreme Court also
rejected defendant's argument that use of the screen had denied him a fair trial by
suggesting his guilt, finding the practice was not "inherently prejudicial," and finding no
evidence of actual prejudice. Id. at 735. Interestingly, however, in arguing in the trial court
that the screen should be used even though the girls could not identify the defendant as their
assailant, the prosecutor asserted that the girls might be traumatized by testifying in the
defendant's presence because they assumed he was guilty. Joint Appendix at 14, Coy (No.
86-6757).
54 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor also wrote a concurring opinion,
in which Justice White joined. Justice Blackmun authored a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
55 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988). Justice Scalia recited the Roman
Governor Festus' discussion of the treatment of Paul that "'[ilt is not the manner of the
Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face
and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.'" Id. (quoting Acts
25:16). Scalia also noted that the right to confrontation may have been recognized in
England before the right to jury trial. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015-16 (citing Daniel H. Pollitt,
The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modem Dress, 8 1. PUB. L. 381, 384-87
(1959)).
56 Id. at 1015 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 174 (1970) (H-arlan, J.,
concurring)). Although a number of colonial constitutions contained provisions similar to
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, scholarly research appears to confirm that
"the Confrontation Clause was apparently included without debate along with the rest of the
Sixth Amendment package of rights--to notice, counsel, and compulsory process-all
incidents of the adversarial proceeding before a jury as evolved during the 17th and 18th
centuries." California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 177 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
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the majority of the Court's Confrontation Clause cases have dealt with either
"the admissibility of out-of-court statements" 57 or "restrictions on the scope of
cross-examination." 58 Justice Scalia rejected the notion that these elements "are
the essence of the Clause's protection"; instead, "'simply as a matter of
English' [the Clause] confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial.'" 59 "We have never doubted, therefore, that
the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."
60
The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause served "ends related both to
appearances and realities." 61 References to and quotations "from antiquity"
were contained in the majority's opinion "to convey that there is something
deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused
and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.'" 62 That
perception of fairness had "much truth to it" because:
It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind
his back." In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less
convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the
witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere,
but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-to-
face confrontation serves much the same purpose as a less explicit component
of the Confrontation Clause that we have had more frequent occasion to
discuss-the right to cross-examine the accuser; both "insur[e] the integrity of
the fact-finding process." 63
also, FRANCiS H. HELLER, THE S=XTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrrrON OF THE
U.S., 22-24 (1951); Pollitt, supra note 55.
57 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
58 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986);
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).
59 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.149, 175 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia went on to note that "simply as a matter of Latin as
well" the word "confront" suggests a face-to-face meeting. Shakespeare's Richard the
Second was cited as further authority for this "root meaning"of confrontation: "'Then call
them to our presence-face to face and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the
accuser and the accused freely speak .... ' Richard 11, act 1, se 1." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
60 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
61 Id. at 1017.
62 Id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). Justice Scalia also asserted
that "[what was true of old is no less true in modem times," citing President Eisenhower's
description of "face-to-face confrontation as part of the code of his home town of Abilene,
Kansas." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017.
63 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736
(1987)).
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The "profound effect" that face-to-face confrontation has upon a witness
was "the very phenomenon [the State] relies upon to establish the potential
'trauma'" of the child witness justifying the screening device utilized in Coy.64
While acknowledging that face-to-face confrontation "may, unfortunately, upset
the truthful rape victim or abused child," Justice Scalia maintained that "it may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs." 65
The Court held that the screening device was an "obvious" and "damaging
violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter." 66 Although
Justice Scalia admitted that prior cases have suggested that "the rights
conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to
other important interests," he explained that the rights involved in those cases
"were not the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause, but rather
rights that are, or were asserted to be, reasonably implicit-namely the right to
cross-examine... the right to exclude out-of-court statements,... and the
asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the proceedings
other than the trial itself." 67 Such cases did not support "holding that we can
identify exceptions in light of other important interests, to the irreducible literal
meaning of the clause: 'a right to meet face to face all those who appear and
give evidence at trial.'" 68 Left "for another day" was whether "any exceptions
exist"; any such exception would "surely be allowed only when necessary to
further an important public policy" and would necessarily require "something
more than the type of generalized finding underlying [the Iowa] statute." 69 In
light of the Court's ruling on the Confrontation Clause claim, the Court found
it "unnecessary" to evaluate defendant's due process claim.
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion agreed that the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights had been violated in this case, but cautioned that
"those rights are not absolute but rather may give way in the appropriate case
to other competing interests." 70 Justice O'Connor emphasized that "the Court
has time and again stated that the Clause 'reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial,' and expressly recognized that this preference may be
overcome in a particular case if close examination of 'competing interests' so
64 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
65 I.
66 Id
67 Id. (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, I.,
concurring)).
69 Coy, 487 U.. at 1021.
70 Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
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warrants." 71 Justice O'Connor wished "to make clear that nothing in today's
decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child
witnesses." 72 Justice O'Connor agreed "with the Court that more than the type
of generalized legislative finding of necessity present here is required" but
noted that "if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity... our cases
suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the
compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses." 73
2. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justice Blackmun rejected both the defendant's Confrontation Clause and
Due Process challenges to the Iowa procedure. He observed that the "essence"
of the confrontation right "is the right to be shown that the accuser is real and
the right to probe accuser and accusation in front of the trier of fact." 74 The
Iowa procedure safeguarded the essence of the right by requiring that the
testimony be given under oath, subject to unrestricted cross-examination and in
front of the jury so it could evaluate the demeanor of the witness. Additionally,
the screening device did not prevent the defendant from seeing and hearing the
witnesses and conferring with counsel during their testimony.75 The only
element of confrontation lacking was the witnesses' ability to see the defendant.
This was, if anything, in Justice Blackmun's view, a "minimal" infringement
on the Confrontation Clause rights. 76
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's reliance on "literature, anecdote
and dicta" to support its characterization of the defendant's claim as involving
"the irreducible literal meaning of the clause." 77 Justice Blackmun found Dean
Wigmore's conclusion that "[tihere never was at common law any recognized
right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as distinguished from cross-
mdination"78 "infinitely more persuasive" than the majority's reliance upon
President Eisenhower or Shakespeare.79 That the witness' ability to see the
71 Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-
64 (1980)).
72 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1023 (O'Connor J., Concurring).
73 Id. at 1025.
74 Id. at 1026 (Blaekmun, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 1027.
76 Id. at 1028.
77 Id. at 1027.
78 Id. at 1028 (quoting 5 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1397, at 158 (J.
Chadbourn ed., rev. 1974)).
79 Id. at 2807. Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Blackmun's reading of Wigmore.
Justice Scalia pointed out that Wigmore "did mention (inconsistently with his thesis, it
would seem), that a secondary purpose of confrontation is to produce a 'certain subjective
moral effect... upon the witness.'" Id. at 1018 n.2 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 78,
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defendant was not an essential part of the Confrontation Clause's protection
was also established by the exceptions to the Clause for certain forms of
hearsay statements, which are rarely made in the defendant's presence.80
Justice Blackmun concluded that since "had blind witnesses testified against
appellant, he could raise no serious objection to their testimony," defendant's
claim that the witnesses were precluded from seeing him because of the screen
could fare no better. 8 '
Justice Blackaun argued that the "preference" for face-to-face
confrontation at trial could give way "to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case," and the "limited departure in this case from the type of
'confrontation' that would normally be afforded at a criminal trial therefore is
proper if it is justified by a sufficiently significant state interest."8 2 Justice
Blacknun stated that the protection of a child witness from the emotional
trauma associated with testifying was sufficiently important to outweigh the
right for face-to-face confrontation. 83 Nor would Justice Blackaun condition
such protective procedures upon a case-specific finding of emotional trauma:
"[a]s the many rules allowing the admission of out-of-court statements
demonstrate, legislative exceptions to the Confrontation Clause of general
applicability are commonplace. I would not impose a different rule here by
requiring the State to make a predicate showing in each case." 84
Justice Blackmun also addressed the defendant's Due Process claim. Justice
Blackmun did not believe that the screening device was "inherently
prejudicial." "Unlike clothing the defendant in prison garb.., or having the
defendant shackled and gagged,... using the screening device did not 'brand
[appellant] ... with an unmistakable mark of guilt.'" 8 5 This was particularly
§ 1395, at 153). Justice Scalia noted that Wigmore "grudgingly acknowledged" that in
"earlier and more emotional periods" this effect "was supposed (more often than it now is)
to be able to unstring the nerves of a false witness." Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 n.2.
80 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1030 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1031.
83 Id. at 1032.
84 Id. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun referred to the examples of "statements of a co-
conspirator, excited utterances, and business records" which were all "generally admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence without case-specific inquiry into the applicability of
the rationale supporting the rule that allows their admission." Id. at 1033 n.6. While it is
certainly true that some lower courts have held that such hearsay evidence is admissible
despite the Confrontation Clause, see infra note 157, the Supreme Court has in fact held
only two types of hearsay admissible under the Confrontation Clause: former testimony and
co-conspirator testimony. See infra text accompanying notes 156-88.
85 Id. at 1034-35 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 571 (1976) (citations
omitted)).
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true in light of the judge's instruction to the jury which directed them to draw
no inference from the use of the screen. 86
D. Post-Coy Confision: Were There Any Exceptions to Face-to-Face
Confrontation?
As the first Supreme Court opinion to address a child witness protection
statute, the Coy decision spawned much scholarly debate. Many feared that the
logic of Coy doomed such statutes87 while others saw a glimmer of hope in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. 88 State courts struggled with the
question left open by Coy as to whether any exceptions to the requirement of a
face-to-face confrontation were permissible.89 A mere two years after the
Court's decision in Coy, an opportunity to answer the question was presented
by Maryland v. Craig.90
86 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1035 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
87 See, e.g., Ellen Foreman, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40
HASTINGS L.I. 437 (1989); W. Andrew Hasselbach, Note, Placing A Cldld Victim of Sexual
Abuse Behind A Screen During Courtroom Testimony As Violation of Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause: Coy v. Iowa, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1537 (1989); Marshall Young &
Sheila McDonald, The Aftermath of Coy v. Iowa: Are South Dakota's C7ild Witness Statutes
in Jeopardy?, 34 S.D. L. REV. 627 (1989); John A. Mayers, Note, Coy v. Iowa: A
Constitutional Right of Intimidation, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 709 (1989); Alisa Odeen, Note,
Defendant's Right to Confront The Witnesses Against Him-Is There An Exception Behind
the Screen?: Coy v. Iowa, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 124 (1988).
88 See, e.g., Beth Bjerregaard, Televised Testimony as an Alternative in OCId Sexual
Abuse Cases, 25 CRIM. LAW BULL. 164 (1989); Jaye Powell Meyer, Note, Protecting the
Child Sexual Abuse Victim From Courtroom Trauma After Coy v. Iowa, 67 N.C. L. REV.
711 (1989); Rachel I. Wollitzer, Note, Sbth Amendment-Defendant's Right To Confront
Witnesses. Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Cid Sexual Assault Cases, 79 1.
CRim. L. & CIU&NOLOGy 759 (1988).
89 Compare the following cases, upholding various child witness protection statutes,
State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (only with individualized showing of
trauma will such statutes be upheld); People v. Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324, aff. 'din part, 803
P.2d 144 (Colo. 1990); State v. Bonello, 554 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1989), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1082 (1989); State v. Snook, 555 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1989); Glendening v. State, 536
So.2d 212 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989); State v. Hoversten, 437 N.W.2d
240 (Iowa 1989); In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342 (Iowa 1989); State v. Conklin, 444
N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989); State v. Davis, 550 A.2d 1241 (N. J. Super Ct. App. Div.
1988); State v. Tafoya, 765 P.2d 1183 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1097 (1989);
Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. 1988); State v, Taylor, 562 A.2d 445
(R.I. 1989); State v. Thomas, 442 N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1989), with the following cases finding
that such statutes offend the Confrontation Clause, State v. Murphy, 542 So.2d 1373 (La.
1989); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988) (state confrontation
clause grounds); State v. Murray, 375 S.E.2d 405 (W.Va. 1988).
90 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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IV. THE COURT'S SECOND ENCOUNTER WITH CHILD WITNESS
PROTECTION STATUTES: MIARLA4ND V. CRAIG UPHOLDS THE USE OF
ONE-WAY CLOSED CIRCUrr TELEVISED TESTIMONY
A. Background
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted in October 1986 for alleged child abuse,
first- and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault and
battery of one of her students over a one and a half-year period.91 The student
in question was seven years old at the time of trial. In addition to calling the
alleged victim, the State intended to call other children who had purportedly
also been abused by Craig. 92
B. The Detennination That the Children's Testimony Should Be
Taken by One-Way Closed Circuit Television
Before trial, the State invoked a Maryland statutory procedure that permits
a child who is the victim of alleged child abuse to testify outside the presence
of the judge, jury and defendant through one-way closed circuit television.93
91 Id. at 3160.92 Id. at 3161. According to Craig's counsel, the so-called corroborating allegations of
the other purportedly abused children were made under questionable circumstances:
The children's allegations were made after a six-month intense and highly publicized
investigation launched as a result of a report of suspected sexual child abuse based on
the comment of a teacher, who worked at another day care facility, to a health
department nurse about a child, who had previously attended the Craig County Pre-
School. That child allegedly reported to someone else that she had a dream about
Pinocchio. The investigation included sending letters to all parents of all children who
had attended the Craig County Pre-School, outlining the allegations of sexual child
abuse. A meeting was held where further information about the allegations was
disseminated and parents urged to have their children 'evaluated' at the Howard County
Sexual Assault Center.
Respondent's Brief at 1 n.1, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
After trial, Craig successfully subpoenaed the therapists', psychologists' and
psychiatrists' notes of the "therapy" sessions with the four children who testified at trial, as
well as the records of the Howard County Sexual Assault Center. Craig maintained that
these materials contained much exculpatory material casting doubt on the credibility of the
children, their competency to testify, and their supposed inability to testify live face-to-face
in a courtroom in the presence of the defendant. Respondent's Brief at 4-5, Craig, (No. 89-
478).
93 The Maryland statute provides:
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Expert testimony was received concerning the difficulty that each child would
experience from testifying in front of the defendant. 94 The trial court did not
question or observe any of the children.
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in section 5-701 of the Family Law Article
or Article 27, section 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child
victim be taken outside the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if-
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and (ii) The judge
determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom will result in
the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge may
question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the child
testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
('i) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the opinion
of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person
who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the defendant
shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in
the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney
pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the
defendant in the courtroom at the same time.
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-102 (1990); see also infra text accompanying
notes 209-19 (highlighting the limitations on the protection afforded by the statute).
94 110 S. Ct. at 3161. The Maryland Court of Appeals characterized the substance of
the expert testimony as follows:
The expert testimony in each case suggested that each child would have some or
considerable difficulty in testifying in Craig's presence. For example, as to one child,
the expert said that what "would cause him the most anxiety would be to testify in front
of Mrs. Craig.. . ." The child "wouldn't be able to communicate effectively." As to
another, an expert said she "would probably stop talking and she would withdraw and
curl up." With respect to two others, the testimony was that one would "become highly
agitated, that he may refuse to talk, that he would choose his subject regardless of the
questions" while the other would "become extremely timid and unwilling to talk."
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Based upon the expert testimony, the court granted the State's motion to
employ the one-way closed circuit television, finding that "'the testimony of
each of these children in a courtroom will result in each child suffering serious
emotional distress... such that each of these children cannot reasonably
communicate.'" 95 The trial court rejected Craig's Confrontation Clause
objection to the procedure, concluding that "although the statute 'take[s] away
the right of the defendant to be face to face with his or her accuser,' the
defendant retains the 'essence of the right of confrontation,' including the right
to observe, cross-examine, and have the jury view the demeanor of the
witness." 96
C. Difficulties Encountered in Utilizing the Procedure
The implementation of the closed circuit television procedure was far from
ideal. The video camera technician was in chambers along with the prosecutor,
defense counsel and a court clerk. Craig, an additional defense counsel, an
additional prosecutor, the judge and the jury were in the courtroom. The image
of the child witness was projected for viewing in the courtroom on two
nineteen-inch television monitors. The jury could see only the child witness on
the screens; the prosecutor and defense attorneys could be heard, but not
seen.
97
There was concern from the outset about the defendant's ability to speak
with her counsel during the testimony. 98 The only way Craig could
communicate with her counsel (who was in chambers with the child) was by
means of an open phone line. The phone receiver was laid on the table next to
defense counsel in chambers. Craig, seated in the jury's view in the courtroom,
sat with the phone receiver to her ear and had to speak loudly enough for
defense counsel to hear her through the open receiver laying on the table.99
Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128-29 (Md. 1989).
95 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162.96 Id. The trial court's ruling was made before the Supreme Court's decision in Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and the trial court obviously did not anticipate that the Court
would reject the Iowa Supreme Court's similar reasoning.
97 Joint Appendix at 89, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478);
Brief for Respondent at 6, Craig (No. 89-478).
98 Joint Appendix at 73-74. See also Respondent's Brief at 5-6.
99 The trial court repeatedly acknowledged the technical difficulties with the phone
communication between Craig and her counsel, and with the process of coordinating
objections. Joint Appendix at 85-87. For example, during the competency voir dire of the
alleged victim, Craig was unable to reach her counsel on the phone, despite repeated
efforts. Id. at 86. The problem with the phone communication continued throughout the
direct and cross-examination of the alleged victim; the judge acknowledged on the record
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The acoustics and placement of the microphone for the child witness also made
it difficult to hear the testimony in the courtroom.l °
The procedure also required that the audio, but not the video projection, be
suspended for resolution of objections to testimony. During the time that
counsel would reappear in the courtroom to argue objections at sidebar, the two
video monitors would continue to show the child's image to the jury. 101
D. The Maryland Court of Appeals Decision
The jury convicted Craig on all counts and the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the conviction. 10° The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 103
While the court of appeals acknowledged that the Confrontation Clause did
not require a face-to-face courtroom encounter in all cases, it concluded that:
[Tihe operative "serious emotional distress" which renders the child victim
unable to "reasonably communicate" must be determined to arise, at least
primarily, from face-to-face confrontation with the defendant. Thus, we
construe the phrase "in the courtroom" as meaning, for sixth amendment and
[state constitution] confrontation purposes, "in the courtroom in the presence
of the defendant." Unless prevention of "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation is
necessary to obtain the trial testimony of the child, the defendant cannot be
denied that right. 104
The court of appeals found the evidence presented in support of using the
one-way closed circuit television procedure "insufficient to reach the high
threshold required" by Coy v. Iowa.105 The court of appeals concluded that
there had been an insufficient "case-specific finding of necessity" 1°6 to warrant
the trial judge's ruling: "he failed to find-and indeed, on the evidence before
him could not have found-that this result [the child's emotional trauma] would
be the product of testimony in a courtroom in the defendant's presence." 10 7
The court of appeals held that, in accordance with Coy, the out-of-court
procedure "ordinarily cannot be invoked unless the child witness initially is
that Craig had been frantically trying to reach her counsel to insist upon a certain line of
cross-examination. Id. at 141-59.
100 Respondent's Brief at 6.
101 Joint Appendix at 83; Respondent's Brief at 7.
102 Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
103 Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989).
104 Id. at 1127.
105 Id. at 1126 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
106 d.107 Id. at 1129.
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questioned (either in or outside the courtroom) in the defendant's presence." 10 8
The court of appeals further contended that before using the one-way television
procedure, the trial judge must determine whether the child can testify using a
two-way television procedure so that the child can see the defendant. 109
E. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a 5-4 decision, vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with its opinion. n 0 Although Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that only two years earlier in Coy v. Iowa the Court
had recognized that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-
to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact," she
countered that "[w]e have never held, however, that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses against them at trial." 11' Justice O'Connor stated that "[b]ecause the
trial court in this case made individualized findings that each of the child
witnesses needed special protection, this case requires us to decide the question
reserved in Coy." 112
Justice O'Connor began her analysis of the Confrontation Clause by
focusing upon its "central concern": "to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing" before the
jury.'1 3 Echoing back to Justice Scalia's etymological argument in Coy, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the word "confront" "also means a clashing of forces
or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness." 114 Relying upon the
Supreme Court's first Confrontation Clause decision, Mattox v. United States
("Mattox II"),115 Justice O'Connor contended that the right guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause included not only "'personal examination'" 116 but also:
"(1) insures that the witness will give his statement under oath... ; (2) forces
the witness to submit to cross-examination... ;[and] (3) permits the
jury... to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement."' 17
108 Id. at 1127; see also Wildermurth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987).
109 Craig v. State, 560 A.2d at 1128.
110 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990).
111 Id. at 3162-63.
112 Id. at 3163.
113 Id.
114 Ij
115 156 U.S. 237 (1895) ("Mattox II").
116 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163 (quoting Mattox 11, 156 U.S. at 242).
117 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)).
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The "combined effect of these elements of confrontation" served the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause.118 Although Justice O'Connor
recognized that face-to-face confrontation "forms 'the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause,'" she asserted that the Court had
"nevertheless recognized that it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation
right." 19 Thus Justice O'Connor observed that "we have never insisted on an
actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance." 120 For example, again
citing Mattox for support, she noted that "we have repeatedly held that the
Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements
against defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at
trial."' 21 In Justice O'Connor's mind, this rule established that the right to
face-to-face confrontation could not be absolute "for the Clause would then,
contrary to our cases, prohibit the admission of any accusatory hearsay
statement made by an absent declarant. ."122 Justice O'Connor therefore
concluded that "[iun sum, our precedents establish that 'the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,. . . a
preference that 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case.'" 23
That the right to face-to-face confrontation was not absolute did not,
however, mean "that it may be easily dispensed with." 124 Justice O'Connor
articulated a two-prong test to determine when face-to-face confrontation may
be abrogated: "only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is
otherwise assured." 125
Justice O'Connor first evaluated the Maryland procedure's compliance with
the "reliability" prong of this test. Although invocation of the Maryland statute
prevented the child witness from seeing the defendant, "it preserves all of the
other elements of the confrontation right": testimony under oath,
118 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163.
119 Id. at 3164 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
120 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3164.
121 Id. at 3164 (citing Mattox H1, 156 U.S. at 243). But see infra text accompanying
notes 161-88 (explaining how Mattox II and its progeny, rather than sanctioning wholesale
exceptions to the right of face-to-face confrontation, have actually demonstrated the
importance placed on face-to-face confrontation at some point in the trialprocess).
122 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165.
123 L (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (emphasis supplied by Justice
O'Connor); Mattox 11, 156 U.S. at 243). But see infra text accompanying notes 161-88
(demonstrating that the "preference" referred to is not whether there is to be face-to-face
confrontation, but when such confrontation may take place to satisfy the constitutional
guarantee).
124 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
125 Id.
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contemporaneous cross-examination, and the ability of the jury to view the
demeanor of the witness. 126 "mhe presence of these other elements of
confrontation... adequately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and
subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to
that accorded in live, in-person testimony." 127 Justice O'Connor concluded that
even if the child's testimony was technically deemed to be hearsay because
given "out of court," "these assurances of reliability and adversariness are far
greater than those required for admission of hearsay testimony under the
Confrontation Clause." 128
The "critical inquiry" therefore became "whether use of the procedure is
necessary to further an important state interest." 129 Justice O'Connor
concluded that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-being
of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in
some cases, a defendant's right" to face-to-face confrontation. 130 The fact that a
significant majority of states had enacted child witness protection statutes
"attests to the widespread belief in the importance of such a public policy."131
In light of the State's traditional interest in protecting the welfare of children,
and "buttressed by the growing body of academic literature documenting the
psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in
court... we will not second-guess the considered judgment of the Maryland
Legislature" regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child
witnesses. 132
The final determination was whether the finding of necessity has been a
"case-specific one: the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether
126 Id.
12 7 Id. Ironically, this formulation was precisely the one utilized by the Iowa Supreme
Court and rejected by the Supreme Court just two years earlier in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012 (1988).
128 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
129 Clraig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
130 Id Justice O'Connor observed that the Court had previously recognized that a
State's interest in "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
embarrassment" is a "compelling one." Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct.,
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982);
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)).
131 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3167.
132 Id. at 3168. Justice O'Connor cited the following academic literature: Brief for
American Psychological Association as Am'cus Curiae; GAIL S. GOODMAN Er AL.,
EMOTIONAL EFFECrs OF CRuMINAL COURT TESTIMONY ON CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT
VICTIMS, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (U.S. Dep't of Justice,
1989). Big see infra text accompanying notes 220-33 (demonstrating that the current state
of academic study of the effects of courtroom testimony upon child witnesses does not
sufficiently differentiate between the impact of the presence of the defendant as opposed to
the effects of the presence of the judge and jury, cross examination, etc.).
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use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect
the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify." 133 The trial
court must assure itself that the trauma would be suffered because of the
presence of the defendant, not by the courtroom generally; "if the state interest
were merely the interest in protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma
generally, denial of face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because
the child could be permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit
with the defendant present." 134 The trial court must also find that the emotional
distress suffered was "more than de minimis, i.e., more than 'mere nervousness
or excitement or some reluctance to testify."''135 Justice O'Connor declined to
"decide the minimum showing of emotional trauma required for use of the
special procedure," 136 finding that the standard employed by the Maryland
statute-"serious emotional distress such that the child cannot
communicate"'137-to "learly... meet constitutional standards." 138
Justice O'Connor rejected the gloss on the Maryland statute that the court
of appeals held was mandated by "the high threshold required by" Coy.13 9
initial questioning of the child (either inside or outside the courtroom) in the
defendant's presence, and determination of whether less restrictive alternatives
(e.g. two-way closed circuit television) would ameliorate the child's trauma.
Although "such evidentiary requirements could strengthen the grounds for use
of protective measures, we decline to establish, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites .... "1 4o
Justice O'Connor believed that the trial court in this case "could well have
found, on the basis of the expert testimony before it," that the Maryland
statutory requirements had been satisfied. 141 Because the court of appeals based
its finding that the requisite finding of necessity had not been established upon
its interpretation of Coy's "high threshold," Justice O'Connor could not "be
certain whether the court of appeals would reach the same conclusion in light
of the legal standard we establish today." 142 Accordingly, the Court vacated
133 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
134 Id. See supra note 49 (setting forth the Iowa statute at issue in Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988), which provided for one-way closed circuit television with the defendant
present).
135 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md.
1990)).
136 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
13 7 MD. CODEANN. CrS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(ii) (1990).
138 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
139 Craig v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1121 (Md. 1989).
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the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 143
F. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia authored a blistering dissent. "Seldom has this Court failed
so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against
the tide of prevailing current opinion." 144 He challenged the majority's
assertion that face-to-face confrontation was not an "indispensable element of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." 145 Although "the Confrontation Clause
does not guarantee reliable evidence, it guarantees specific trial procedures that
were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was 'face-
to-face' confrontation." 146 Rejecting the majority's assertion that the Court's
prior Confrontation Clause opinions reflect a mere "preference for face-to-face
confrontation," Justice Scalia explained that such precedents "dealt with the
implications of the Confrontation Clause and not its literal, unavoidable
text." 147 Justice Scalia maintained that "the mode of analysis we have used in
the admission of hearsay evidence" could not "be applied.., to permit what is
explicitly forbidden by the constitutional text." 148 In addition, the hearsay
analysis has generally included a requirement of unavailability. Justice Scalia
143 Id. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Maryland Court of Appeals again
reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Craig v. State, 588 A.2d 328
(Md. 1991). The second opinion of the court of appeals again finds that there was no
"particularized examination of all the circumstances" focusing on "the impact of public
testimony in the presence of the defendant upon the emotional health of the child." Id. at
333. Additionally, the court of appeals refused to jettison its prior gloss upon the statute that
(1) the child initially be questioned (either inside or outside the courtroom) in the
defendant's presence; and (2) that less restrictive alternatives, such as two-way television, be
considered. Instead, the court of appeals decided that "they should be preserved, not as
commands, but as an aid to the trial judge, in appropriate circumstances, in the
determination of the condition precedent prescribed by section 9-109(a)(1)(ii)." Id. at 338.
144 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 3166.
146 Id. at 3172.
147 Id. at 3172-73. For example, Justice Scalia suggests that what Ohio v. Roberts
"had in mind was the receipt of other-than-first-hand testinony from witnesses at trial-that
is, witnesses' recounting of hearsay statements by absent parties who, since they did not
appear at trial, did not have to endure face-to-face confrontation." Id. Justice Scalia agreed
that "[riejecting that... was merely giving effect to an evident constitutional preference;
there are, after all, many exceptions to the Confrontation Clause's hearsay rule. But that the
defendant should be confronted by the witnesses who appear at trial is not a preference
'reflected' by the Confrontation Clause; it is a constitutional right unqualifiedly guaranteed."
Id.
148 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rejected the notion that inability to testify in the presence of the defendant
satisfied such a requirement: "[i]f unconfronted testimony is admissible hearsay
when the witness is unable to confront the defendant, then presumably there are
other categories of admissible hearsay consisting of unswom testimony when
the witness is unable to risk perjury, uncross-examined testimony when the
witness is unable to undergo hostile questioning, etc." 14
9
Justice Scalia also challenged the majority's characterization of the State's
interest which supposedly outweighed "the explicit text of the Constitution." 150
Justice Scalia did not believe that the Maryland statute was designed to protect
child witnesses, because the State always has the prerogative not to call as
witnesses children who will be traumatized by the experience. "The State's
interest here is in fact no more and no less than what the State's interest always
is when it seeks to get a class of evidence admitted in criminal proceedings:
more convictions of guilty defendants. That is not an unworthy interest, but it
should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one." 151 Justice Scalia observed
that the "'special' reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees
of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps matched by
'special' reasons for being particularly insistent upon it in the case of children's
testimony [because] [s]ome studies show that children are substantially more
vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected
fantasy (or suggestion) from reality." 152
But Justice Scalia felt that this scholarly debate was inappropriate because
the value of confrontation need not be defended "because the Court has no
authority to question it." 153 Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had
engaged in interest-balancing "where the text of the Constitution simply does
149 Id. at 3174.
150 Id. at 3175.
151 Id.
152 Id. (citing D. Stephen Lindsay & Marcia K. Johnson, Reality Monitoring and
Suggestibility: Guldren's Ability to Discriminate Among Memories From Afferent Sources,
in CHILDREN's EYEWrrNESS MEMORY 92 (S. Ceci, et al. eds., 1987); Thomas L. Feher,
The Alleged Molestation Victim, The Rules of Evidence and the Constitution: Should
Cuildren Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227, 230-33 (1987); John R.
Christiansen, The Testimony of Oild Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy and the Influence of Pretrial
Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REv. 705, 708-11 (1987)). Justice Scalia also made reference to
the Jordan, Minnesota prosecutions. See supra note 10. Added to the above list could be the
McMartin case in California. See supra note 10. The therapist's notes in the Craig case
itself which, when produced after trial, revealed the therapist's belief that "fantasy and
reality were mixed up for" the alleged victim. See supra note 92; Respondent's Brief at 4,
Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
153 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This was a change from Justice
Scalia's approach in the Coy decision, in which he apparently felt the need to attempt to
justify the constitutional interest advanced by face-to-face confrontation by reference to the
Bible, Shakespeare and Eisenhower. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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not permit it. We are not free to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of clear and
explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning to comport
with our findings." 154
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MARILAND V. CRAIG
The Craig majority's analysis is deficient in several respects. It misreads
prior precedent concerning the purported mere "preference" for face-to-face
confrontation. The Court announces a new test that is unsupported by
precedent and has the potential to seriously erode both the right to face-to-face
confrontation and other essential trial protections. The Court then misapplies
the test it devises and ignores several other constitutional infirmities present in
the Maryland statutory scheme. After a full analysis of all of these deficiencies,
it becomes clear that one-way closed circuit television statutes that remove the
child witness from the presence of the defendant cannot pass constitutional
muster.
A. The Confrontation Clause Does Not Reflect a Mere "Preference"
for Face-to-Face Confrontation
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Craig is premised upon the belief that the
Court's prior Confrontation Clause decisions have sanctioned the admissibility
of a broad array of hearsay exceptions and that these decisions therefore
demonstrate that face-to-face confrontation was a mere "preference" which
could be overcome by an important state interest.155 This premise is, however,
demonstrably incorrect.
The Court has not sanctioned a broad array of hearsay exceptions, although
there is certainly much dicta in the Court's decisions suggesting such a
conclusion.1 56 Many lower courts have relied upon such dicta to hold that
154 Id.
155 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3164-66.
156 See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) ("MattoxiI")
("general rules of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the
accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of
the case .... For instance, there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the
[Confrontation Clause] than the admission of dying declarations... yet from time
immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have the
hardihood at this day to question their admissibility."); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S.
325, 330 (1911) ("But this general rule of law embodied in the Constitution... has always
had certain well-recognized exceptions."); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107
(1934) ("Nor has the privilege of confrontation at any time been without recognized
exceptions, as, for instance, dying declarations or documentary evidence."); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) ("This Court has recognized the admissibility against an
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numerous hearsay exceptions are permitted under the Confrontation Clause;157
at least one court, however, has labeled the Court's discussions of generalized
hearsay exceptions to the Confrontation Clause as the "'Sistine Chapel' of
obiter dicta."158 In fact, the Court (prior to its recent decision in White v.
Illinois'5 9) had actually authorized but two forms of hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause: former testimony and co-conspirator statements.160 An
accused of dying declarations and of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a
former trial. There are other analogous situations which might not fill within the scope of
the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses."); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 80 (1970) ("It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to confrontation
requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced."); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980) ("In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.").
157 See, e.g., Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (excited utterance); Hutchins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 512, 516
(11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984) (statement of anonymous informant to
police); United States v. Washington, 688 F.2d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1982) (business records);
Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 810-11 (8th Cir. 1981) (state of mind exception); Williams
v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984) (res
gestae); United States v. H. & M., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 651, 668 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (statement
against penal interest); People v. Webb, 466 N.E.2d 936, 945 (111. App. Ct. 1984) (dying
declaration, relying upon dicta in Pointer v.Texas); State v. Wyss, 370 N.W.2d 745, 758
(1985) (statement to doctor); Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1106 (D.C. 1984)
(adoptive admission); State v. Palomo, 783 P.2d 575 (Wash. 1989) (excited utterance);
State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. 1983) (excited utterance).
158 People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1252 (II. App. Ct. 1990), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 1681 (1991).
159 See supra note 182.
160 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986). Some commentators
have suggested that four exceptions have been recognized: (1) prior testimony of deceased
witnesses and dying declarations; (2) prior inconsistent statements; (3) former testimony of
unavailable witness; and (4) statements of co-conspirators. Brent J. Fields, Maryland v.
Craig: The Constitutionality of aosed Circuit Tesnmony in OCild Sexual Abuse Cases, 25
GA. L. REV. 167, 175-79 (1990). The prior testimony of a deceased witness and the prior
testimony of an unavailable witness have been treated analytically identically by the Court.
As will be shown, the Court has never actually sanctioned dying declarations as an
exception to the Confrontation Clause. See supra note 165. While it is true that Cahfbrnia v.
Green involved a California statutory hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements,
the statement at issue was one made under oath at a preliminary hearing in the presence of
the defendant and subject to cross-examination and thus was the functional equivalent of
former testimony. 399 U.S. 149, 151-53 (1970). The only other Confrontation Clause
exception which the Court may have recognized was for "[d]ocumentary evidence to
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analysis of both lines of cases will demonstrate that neither exception suggests
that face-to-face confrontation is a mere "preference."
1. The Former Testimony Cases Show a Concern for When
Confrontation Occurs, Not Whether It Should Occur
The Court's first direct encounter with the Confrontation Clause occurred
in 1895 in Mattox v. United States (Mattox ).)161 The case involved a retrial of
a defendant. The government introduced into evidence the prior testimony of
two witnesses who had appeared and testified at the first trial, but who had died
before the second trial had commenced. Because both witnesses were fully
examined and cross-examined at the former trial in the presence of the
defendant, the Court held that the introduction of their prior testimony did not
violate the defendant's right to confrontation. The Court explained that "[tihe
authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the defendant
was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before a
committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is
overwhelming." 162 The defendant could not claim that the introduction of the
former testimony violated his right to confront the witnesses against him
because the "substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the
establish collateral facts admissible under the common law ... . Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); but see Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1899) ("A
fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses cannot be proved against an
accused, charged with a different offense... except by witnesses who confront him at the
trial. ....).
161 156 U.S. 237 (1895). There had been an earlier case which could have presented
the opportunity to address the interplay of the Confrontation Clause and hearsay, but it was
decided on other grounds. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Reynolds
involved a criminal bigamy conviction in which the government introduced the prior
testimony of the defendant's alleged second wife which had been given at a former trial of
the same offense, but under a different indictment. The government had attempted to
subpoena the alleged second wife, but the defendant and his family had successfully kept
her whereabouts secret. Relying upon a long line of both English and American authority,
the Court ruled that the introduction of the prior testimony had not offended the
Confrontation Clause because "[t]he Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by
his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to
supply the place of what he kept away." Id. at 158. The Court did not analyze whether
absent the defendant's misbehavior, the prior testimony would be admissible, but
foreshadowing part of its subsequent analysis in Mattox l the Court did observe that "[tihe
accused was present at the time the testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-
examination." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
162 Mattax 1I, 156 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added).
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prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face,
and subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination." 163
But in its first detailed analysis of the interplay of hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause, the Court began painting its "'Sistine Chapel' of obiter
dicta" by discussing another hearsay exception which was not at issue before
the Court: the dying declaration. The Court's dicta suggested that dying
declarations "from time immemorial... have been treated as competent
testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their
admissibility." 164 The Court's imprecision in analysis might be explained by
the fact that just three years earlier it had reversed the same defendant's
conviction in.his first trial (Mattox 1), in part because the trial court had
improperly limited the defendant's attempts to introduce evidence under the
dying declaration exception. 165 But Mattox I did not raise any Confrontation
Clause issue because the evidence was being offered by the defendant, not
against the defendant.
Neither Mattox I nor Mattox Il holds that dying declarations are exceptions
to the right of face-to-face confrontation, although they are frequently cited for
such a proposition. 166 Instead, Mattox II stands for the proposition that
although the Confrontation Clause envisions that face-to-face confrontation will
occur at trial, occasionally "considerations of public policy and the necessities
of the case" 167 may allow former confronted testimony to be admitted when the
witness cannot be produced again to testify.
Subsequent cases involving the former testimony exception refined the
Confrontation Clause analysis but did not suggest that face-to-face
confrontation was a mere "preference." Face-to-face confrontation was always
required at some point in time. 168 Furthermore, if the circumstances under
which the former testimony was taken did not afford the defendant an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, introduction of the transcript would
violate the defendant's confrontation rights. 169 Out of deference for the
163 Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
164 Id. at 243-44.
165 Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 152 (1892) ("Mattox I").
166 See, e.g. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3164-65 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012, 1030-32 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64,
67 n.8 (1990); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Fields, supra note 159, at 175-76; Schwalb, supra note 10, at 193 n.29.167 Matox/ 1, 156 U.S. at 243.
168 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (defendant's Confrontation Clause rights
were not violated by his exclusion from a hearing to determine initially the competency of
two children to testify, where he was present during their trial testimony during which the
issue of their competency was subject to re-examination if the evidence warranted).
169 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (the State introduced a transcript of the
testimony of a witness who had testified at a preliminary hearing in the presence of the
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Confrontation Clause's "preference" for face-to-face confrontation at trial, the
Court required the government to demonstrate that a witness was truly
unavailable to testify at trial before it would be allowed to use prior confronted
testimony as a substitute.170 If a witness was testifying at trial, his prior
inconsistent testimony could be introduced without violating the Confrontation
Clause because he could be adequately confronted at trial.171
This analysis of the former testimony cases suggests that Justice O'Connor
chose to place emphasis on the wrong word in the following quote from Ohio
v. Roberts; instead of emphasizing the word "preference," she should have
emphasized the words "at trial": "the Confrontation Clause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial" that "must occasionally give
way" to the use of former testimony that has been subjected to face-to-face
confrontation and cross-examination prior to trial.172 The former testimony
defendant, who at the time was not represented by counsel and who did not cross-examine
the witness. The Court held that because the circumstances under which the testimony had
been taken did not afford the defendant an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
defendant, the introduction of the testimony at trial violated the defendant's confrontation
rights). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (preliminary testimony of absent
witness admissible where defendant's counsel conducted the equivalent of cross-
examination, even though witness had been called by defense). Similarly, introduction of
confessions implicating the defendant made by witnesses who did not appear at trial or who
refused to testify claiming their right against self-incrimination was not permissible. See
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (admission of a co-defendant's confession that
implicated the appellant violated the Confrontation Clause when the co-defendant did not
take the stand); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (the Court reversed a conviction
because the prosecution introduced the confession of the defendant's alleged accomplice
who refused to testify on self-incrimination grounds).
170 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (The State introduced the preliminary
hearing testimony of an individual who, at the time of trial, was serving a sentence in a
federal penitentiary in an adjoining state. The Court held that such evidence could not be
introduced under an "unavailability" exception to the State's hearsay rules where the State
had not made a "good-faith effort" to obtain the presence of the witness at trial). See also
Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (preliminary hearing testimony admissible where
State had served five trial subpoenas, witness had left the state, and even witness's parents
did not know where she could be located); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972)
(prior trial testimony admissible when witness had permanently relocated to Sweden at time
of second trial).
171 Green v. California, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). In Green, the state sought to
introduce at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness whose trial testimony was
inconsistent with the preliminary hearing testimony under California's prior inconsistent
statement hearsay exception. The Court found that, because the witness was present at trial
and could be "confronted" concerning both his trial testimony and his preliminary hearing
testimony, no Confrontation Clause violation was present.
172 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3165 (1990) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 63; Mattox 11, 156 U.S. at 243).
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cases lend no support to the notion that a defendant may be denied the right to
face-to-face confrontation with respect to a witness who appears and testifies at
trial.173
173 The former testimony cases also do not strictly support Roberts' "general
approach" to the admission of hearsay. The former testimony cases do require
"unavailability" as a condition for admissibility. See supra note 169. But, notwithstanding
some dicta in the cases, "reliability" has been assured not by the status of former testimony
as a traditionally recognized exception to the hearsay rule, but from the fact that the
defendant was previously afforded a right to face-to-face confrontation and cross-
examination.
Examination of the former testimony cases cited in Roberts confirms this analysis. In
Mattox H, cited in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67, the hearsay was admissible because the
"substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he
has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-
examination." 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). In Pointer v. Texas, cited in Roberts, 448 U.S. 66
n.8, the former testimony was not properly admitted because, although the defendant had
confronted the witness face-to-face, the defendant had not had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407. In Mancssi v. Stubbs, cited in Roberts 448 U.S. at
66-67, the former testimony was admitted because the witness was unavailable and because
the defendant's lawyer at the first trial was deemed to have had an adequate opportunity to
cross-examine despite having been on the case for four days before trial. Mancusi, 408 U.S.
at 213-16. In California v. Green, cited in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67, reliability was assured
because of the ability of the defendant to confront and cross-examine the witness at trial
concerning his prior testimony. Green, 399 U.S. at 165. In Roberts itself, the Court's
"reliability" analysis focused not on the status of former testimony as a traditionally
recognized hearsay exception, but rather upon whether defense counsel had tested the
former "testimony with the equivalent of significant cross-examination." Roberts, 448 U.S.
at70.
Nor do the two non-former testimony cases cited by the Roberts Court support such a
"general approach" to hearsay admission. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934),
cited in Roberts 448 U.S. at 64, is arguably neither a hearsay case nor a Confrontation
Clause case at all. The Snyder Court held that the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were not violated by his absence from a jury's trip to view the scene of the
crime; in dicta, the Court observed that no Confrontation Clause issue was presented
because "the privilege of confrontation... is limited to the stages of the trial when there
are witnesses to be questioned." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107. The Roberts Court also quoted
dicta from Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Dutton involved the admission of co-
conspirator statements; as will be explained, the development of the co-conspirator
"exemption" from the hearsay rule is sui generis and is not predicated upon the same
evidentiary concerns for reliability that have traditionally been the concern of other hearsay
exceptions. See infra discussion accompanying notes 174-88.
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2. The Co-Conspirator "Exception" Does Not Support the
Transfonnation of the Confrontation Right Into a Mere "Preference"
The rationale for the existence of an "exemption" from-rather than an
"exception" to' 74-the hearsay rule for co-conspirator statements is far from
intellectually satisfying. The admissibility of co-conspirator statements
developed as a matter of the substantive law of conspiracy. 175 Acts of one co-
conspirator were admissible against all of the co-conspirators because each was
deemed to have consented to all acts taken to promote the common objective of
the conspiracy. 176 This rule was based upon the legal fiction that each co-
conspirator was the "agent" of the rest.177 As early as 1827, co-conspirator
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy were held to be admissible by
the Supreme Court as part of the res gestae that was essential to the furtherance
of the conspiracy. 178 Thus, unlike the exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are
predicated upon inherent indicia of reliability, 179 the co-conspirator exemption
"is supported by a series of legal fictions, and is based primarily upon policy
notions that are completely unrelated to evidence considerations." 180 Perhaps
this explains the Court's very different treatment of this area.
Although the Court in Ohio v. Roberts purported to announce, in dicta, a
general approach to the admission of hearsay under the Confrontation
174 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that co-conspirator statements are not to be
treated as hearsay at all. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Although the Court in the non-
conspiracy area has indicated that testimony that is not hearsay does not raise Confrontation
Clause concerns, Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985), the Court has explicitly
refused to base its analysis of the admission of co-conspirator statements upon the distinction
between it being exempted from the hearsay rule, rather than excepted from the hearsay
rule. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 n.12 (1986).
175 S. Douglas Borisky, Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Co-Conspirator
Exemption From the Hearsay Rule and The Confrontation Cause of the Sixth Anwndment,
85 COLUM. L. REv. 1294, 1307 (1985).
176 See id. See also, United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 462 (1827).
177 This legal fiction has been severely criticized. As one commentator noted:
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not require that the out-of-court statement relate to the
declamnt's assigned role in the conspiracy or that the defendant be aware of who his
cohorts were or what they were saying and doing during the conspiracy. Furthermore,
in a large or secretive conspiracy, the extrajudicial declarant may have had no
knowledge of the defendant's role in the conspiracy. Therefore, a declarant's statement,
based on incomplete information, may mislead the trier of fact.
Borisky, supra note 175, at 1308.
178 Id. at 1307; Gooding, 25 U.S. at 469-70.
179 Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147 (1990).
180 Borisky, supra note 175, at 1300.
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Clause,181 and although the Court cited with approval the Roberts dicta in both
craig and Wright,182 it has refused to apply this general hearsay approach to
co-conspirator statements.183 Instead, the Court has held that co-conspirator
statements are admissible, even if the declarant is available,' 8 4 and without any
independent determination that the statements are reliable. 185 This has been
justified because the competency of the evidence is "steeped in our
jurisprudence" 186 and because co-conspirator statements "are made while the
conspiracy is in progress,... [and therefore] provide evidence of the
conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to
the same matters in court."187
In short, the cases dealing with co-conspirator statements appear to be the
result of an historical accident involving development of the substantive law of
conspiracy. Their analytic shortcomings, however, do not support any notion
that the right to face-to-face confrontation is a mere "preference." 188
181 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
182 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165; Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3146.
183 In People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1252 (Il. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct.
736 (1992), the Illinois court read the Court's refusal to apply the generalized Roberts dicta
to co-conspirator statements as a complete repudiation of Roberts. That court held that as a
result of Inadi:
Whether the out-of-court declarant is unavailable is totally irrelevant to the
determination of whether an out-of-court statement of that declarant is admissible under
an exception or exemption to the hearsay rule. The only exception to this holding is the
factual situation present in Roberts, Le., the use at trial of the previous testimony of a
witness who is no longer available.
Wte, 555 N.E.2d at 1252. Although in light of the Court's subsequent favorable citation to
Roberts in both Craig and Wright, see supra note 182, it was far from clear that the Court
had entirely repudiated Roberts, the Court's recent Wite decision now plainly limits
Roberts to the admissibility of former testimony. White, 112 S. Ct. at 741-42. For an in-
depth analysis critical of the White decision, see Robert H. King, Jr., Confronting the
Confusion. Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause Before and After White v. IElinois
(unpublished Article March 1992).184 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
185 Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987).
186 Id. at 183.
187 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395.
188 It is far from clear to what extent Justice O'Connor derives her understanding that
face-to-face confrontation is a mere "preference" from the co-conspirator cases. In Craig,
Justice O'Connor refers to the "modem" co-conspirator cases (Inadi and Boujai/y) only in
passing, as an example of the "narrow circumstances" in which "competing interests, if
'closely examined,' may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial." Craig, 110 S. Ct.
at 3165 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). Since this exemption existed at common law at the time of drafting
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B. Craig Utilized the Wrong Test for Determining When Face-to-Face
Confrontation Could Be Abrogated
The right to face-to-face confrontation is not a mere "preference": But is it
"absolute?" Other Sixth Amendment rights are not absolute: the right to
compulsory process does not prohibit the exclusion of a witness whose identity
is not disclosed as required by a state's discovery rule,189 the right to a jury
trial does not apply when a defendant is charged with a petty offense,190 the
fair-cross-section requirement does not guarantee a representative jury in any
particular case, 191 the right to effective assistance of counsel does not guarantee
a defendant the right to consult with counsel during a recess in his
testimony, 192 and the right to face-to-face confrontation itself may be waived or
forfeited. 193 Justice Black toiled for years in the vineyard of "absolutes" in the
First Amendment area without success. Is it reasonable to expect the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause to receive any better treatment?
Since its first encounter with the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly (in dicta) suggested that the right of face-to-face confrontation
could not be absolute if any hearsay was admissible in criminal trials. The
Court has repeatedly declared that a rule eliminating all hearsay would "be too
extreme" and "unintended" by the Confrontation Clause.194 Regardless of the
reason, former testimony and co-conspirator statements are admitted without
face-to-face confrontation. So, argues Justice O'Connor, the right to face-to-
face confrontation cannot be absolute.
of the Constitution, it could be argued, consistent with the reasoning of Mattox 11, that this
anomaly was meant to be grafted onto the Confrontation Clause. Or the "modem" co-
conspirator cases could be categorized as part of the Court's "Sistine Chapel of obiter
dicta," because they could all have been decided on narrower grounds (i.e., lack of
reliability), making their Confrontation Clause analysis needless and confusing. See, e.g.,
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (admission of statement by one non-testifying co-
conspirator harmless where his reliability was questionable and nineteen others appeared at
trial and testified); Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395 (admission of statement of one non-testifying co-
conspirator harmless where his reliability was questionable and three other co-conspirators
appeared and testified); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 185 (sufficient independent evidence of guilt
such that the introduction of co-conspirator testimony whose reliability was questionable was
harmless).
189 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
190 Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
191 Holland v. Ilinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
192 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
193 Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970).
194 See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
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Justice Scalia might argue that admission of such evidence does not
technically violate the Confrontation Clause since the absent declarant is not a
"witness" at trial "against" the defendant. 195 While at first blush this argument
might seem hypertechnical and silly, it does hide a fundamental truth: the Craig
situation, unlike the recognized "exceptions" to the Confrontation Clause, was
not a hearsay case. It was a case in which a witness appeared at trial and
testified. The fact that the Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to
allow the introduction of certain types of hearsay evidence does not preclude
interpreting the Clause so that a defendant's right to confront witnesses who
actually appear and testify at trial is absolute. Such an approach would be
consistent with the dual functions of the Clause: a procedural function to insure
the appearance of fairness196 and an evidentiary function to insure the
reliability of evidence received at trial. 197
Admittedly, the Court as presently composed is unlikely to embrace an
"absolutist" approach to the Confrontation Clause. Whether or not deemed
"absolute," however, the Court has recognized that the defendant's right to
confrontation is "fundamental." 198 Ordinarily, when the State seeks to impinge
upon a fundamental right, it must demonstrate that such restriction is necessary
"in order to promote a compelling interest" and the State must choose "the
least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." 199 "It is not enough
to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must be
carefully tailored to achieve those ends." 200 Indeed, such a "strict scrutiny" test
had been used by the Court in cases raising related issues of the protection of
195 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171-74 (1990) (Scala, I., dissenting).
Justice Scalia argued that the Confrontation Clause does not literally prohibit hearsay
evidence at all since it guarantees the defendant only the right to confront "the witnesses
against him." The noun "witness," argued Justice Scalia, means either "one who knows or
sees any thing," or "one who gives testimony." Id. at 3173 (quoting 2 NoAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). While Justice Scalia
acknowledged that the first definition would cover hearsay evidence, he contended that such
an interpretation is precluded by "the words that follow the noun: 'witnesses against him.'"
Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173-74 (Scalia, I., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that "[t]he
phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at trial." Id.
196 See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018-19 (1988).
197 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1970).
198 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405-06 (1965) (the right of
confrontation is "an essential and fundamental requirement for... [a] fair trial."); Green,
399 U.S. at 176 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("If anything, the confrontation guarantee may be
thought, along with the right to compulsory process, merely to constitutionalize the right to
a defense as we know it"); C. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (right to a fair trial
"the most fundamental of all freedoms").199 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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child trial witness: explicitly in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,20 1
which reviewed a state statute authorizing closed trials of specified sexual
offenses involving children, and sub silentio in Davis v. Alaska,202 a case
involving review of a state statute which had been held to bar impeachment of a
juvenile witness with his prior juvenile offenses.
Yet this was not the test employed by Justice O'Connor. Instead she
developed a totally new test, which seemed to borrow both from the "middle"
level scrutiny test employed in the equal protection cases for "quasi-suspect"
classifications, 20 3 and the so-called "general approach" hearsay test of Ohio v.
Roberts. She required that the state show only that an abridgement of the right
was "necessary to further an important public policy," and demonstrate that
"the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 2°4 This was a significant
and improper departure from precedent and could have devastating effects upon
all defendants' Sixth Amendment trial rights.
Implicit in this test is a denigration of the confrontation right. Unlike other
fundamental rights, confrontation can be obviated upon a showing of only an
"important interest." Many state interests may be "important" ranging from
protection of rape victims, elderly victims, and victims of racial violence to the
balancing of the budget. But until Craig, merely "important" state interests
were not enough to justify restricting a fundamental right; a compelling state
interest was required. Although the cynic might point to several Court
decisions which seemed to elevate even mundane state interests into compelling
ones when necessary to justify some government intrusion on a particular
right,205 the difference in magnitude of the interest required is not without
significance.
Gone is any sort of requirement that the restriction be narrowly tailored to
address the interest sought to be advanced. Instead, once an "important
201 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982). Justice O'Connor expressly relied upon Globe
Newspaper in asserting that the State's interest in "'the protection of minor victims of sex
crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling' one." Maryland v. Craig,
110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 (1990).
202 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) ("The State's policy interest in protecting the
confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness. The
State could have protected [the juvenile] from exposure of his juvenile adjudication in these
circumstances by refraining from using him to make out its case; the State cannot,
consistent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of
vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy ofjuvenile criminal records.").
203 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.").
204 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166 (emphasis added).
205 See, e.g. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
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interest" is shown, all the courts are to be concerned with is whether the
"reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 206 But it is virtually
impossible to discern whether the testimony is as reliable as it would have been
had there been confrontation. As in the situation of the Sixth Amendment's
right to "conflict-free" counsel, "the evil... is in what the advocate finds
himself compelled to refrain from doing." 207 No one will ever know what the
child would have testified if the defendant had been present in the room during
the testimony. "Reliability" may also be affected by the manner in which the
closed circuit television system is operated, how effectively the defendant can
communicate with her counsel, and other factors which can only be determined
after the testimony has occurred and the right abridged.
Also missing from the Court's new test is any acknowledgement of the
defendant's interest in face-to-face confrontation. In other words, if the state's
interest is "important" and the evidence "reliable," then the defendant's
confrontation right simply becomes nonexistent. This test does transform the
confrontation right into a mere preference, for any time that the state deems it
"important" to do so, the right may be ignored. Such a test has the potential
for great mischief: Can the right to jury trial or counsel be abrogated if
necessary to help minimize the trauma to child witnesses (an important state
interest), or to help balance the budget (an important state interest), so long as
the evidence received and the outcome of the trial is "reliable"?
There was no reason for Justice O'Connor to deviate from the strict
scrutiny test in the Craig case, other than an implicit recognition that the
Maryland procedure could not possibly survive such scrutiny.208
C. Even if the Craig Test Was Appropriate, It Was Misapplied
Assuming that the Craig test was appropriate, Justice O'Connor misapplied
it. She ignored certain features about the statute itself which suggest that the
state's interest was not so important, she misunderstood the present state of
research on the effects of testifying in court upon abused children, and she
made assumptions concerning the reliability of the testimony which were not
supported by the record. Even applying the Craig test, the Court should have
affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision.
206 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
207 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978). See also Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776, 800 (1987) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) ("Because the conflict primarily compels
the lawyer not to pursue certain arguments or take certain actions, it is all the more difficult
to discern its effect."); Respondent's Brief at 23, Craig, (No. 89-478).
208 Because of the way the Maryland statute was drafted, it is doubtful that the interest
it was advancing would be found "compelling" or narrowly drawn to advance such
interests. See infra discussion accompanying notes 210-19.
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1. The Maryland Statute Itself Undermined Any Claim That Elimination
of Face-to-Face Confrontation Was Necessary to Further an Important
State Interest
The Court assumed that the Maryland statutory procedure was "necessary"
to further an "important" state interest: "protecting child witnesses from the
emotional trauma of testifying" in the presence of the defendant.209 However,
while this interest might be an important one in the abstract, the Maryland
statute was not designed to further that interest.210
If the state's goal was to protect children from the emotional trauma of
testifying in the presence of the defendant, it drafted the statute in a peculiar
fashion. 211 In the first place, it does not afford protection to all abused child
witnesses: Section 9-102 applies only to a child under the age of eighteen
whose alleged molester is a parent or other person who has permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child.212
While it is true that studies suggest that many molestation cases fall within the
209 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
2 10 A fundamental problem with the Maryland statute is that it does not recognize that
there are two reasons that a child might be so emotionally traumatized by testifying in the
presence of the defendant that she could not communicate. The first reason is that the
defendant has previously harmed her in a particularly offensive manner (and hence is guilty
of the crime). But a second possible reason is that the child is afraid of testifying in the
defendant's presence because she is lying. Clearly, although the state may have an
important interest in protecting the child in the first instance, it has no interest in protecting
the child in the latter instance. The statute authorizes use of the one-way closed circuit
television procedure in both instances.
211 Indeed, the statute as drafted did not limit itself to trauma induced by testimony in
the presence of the defendant. Rather, the statute on its face applies if "testimony by the
child victim in the counroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate." MD. CODE ANN. CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-
102(a)(1)(ii) (1990) (emphasis added). The legislative history cited by the Craig majority
confirms that the statute was not aimed at insulating the child witness from the defendant per
se, but from the trauma associated with the courtroom atmosphere. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at
3168 ("The proposal was 'aimed at alleviating the trauma to a child victim in die courtroom
atmosphere by allowing the child's testimony to be obtained outside of the courtroom.'" Id.
(quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (Md. 1987)). The statute as drafted would
thus clearly not survive even the Craig majority's analysis were it not for a limiting
construction imposed by the Maryland Court of Appeals which construed the phrase "in the
courtroom" to necessarily imply "in the courtroom in the presence of the defendant." Craig
v. State, 560 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Md. 1989).
2 12 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1987); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-701
(Supp. 1989); Respondent's Brief at 25, Craig (No. 89-478).
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ambit of the statute, 213 it is equally true that many cases will not. Moreover,
the one-way closed circuit television procedure is not mandated even for all
children younger than eighteen allegedly molested by a guardian: The
"protection" of the statute is available only for those children whose trauma
while testifying will render them unable to "reasonably communicate." 214
Children who will be severely traumatized by testifying-but are still able to
communicate-receive no benefit from the statute.215
The Maryland legislature may also have recognized that the interest it
sought to advance by the statute was not superior to the defendant's right of
face-to-face confrontation. The statute specifically provides that "[tlhe
provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney pro
se." 216 In other words, if a defendant chooses to represent himself during trial,
the state may not invoke the one-way closed circuit procedure. Is this a tacit
admission by the legislature that ultimately the defendant's face-to-face
confrontation right is superior to the state's interest in protecting child
witnesses from trauma? It might be argued that this concession does not
constitute recognition of the importance of face-to-face confrontation, but rather
only the constitutional necessity of cross-examination. This may be true, but if
cross-examination was the only interest which was being accomodated,
presumably other methods of preserving cross-examination without allowing
face-to-face confrontation could have been specified. For example, the statute
could have prescribed the use of a one-way closed circuit television system in
which the pro se defendant cross-examined the child from the courtroom via an
audio system without face-to-face confrontation. Or the statute could have
mandated the appointment of counsel for the limited purpose of cross-
examining the child, an alternative that appears to have been adopted by at least
one state having a one-way closed circuit television statute.217 Maryland chose
neither of those alternatives. Instead, if the defendant chooses to appear pro se,
213 See, e.g., Nahman H. Greenberg, The Epidemiology of C~ildhood Sexual Abuse,
51 PEDiARIuC ANNALs 289, 291-92 (1979).
2 14 MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & IUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(i) (1990).
215 See Schwalb, supra note 10, at 196.
216 MD. CODEANN. CrS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-102(c) (1990).
217 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (West Supp. 1989). Surprisingly, very
few of the child witness statutes specifically address the issue of the pro se defendant. The
Delaware videotape statute expressly provides that a pro se defendant has the right to
confront and question the child witness. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987). The
Missouri videotape statute provides that if the defendant has no counsel, the court will
appoint one. Mo. ANN. STAT. 491.680.6 (Vernon Supp. 1989). The Vermont videotape
rule acknowledges that certain adjustments in the procedure will be required if the defendant
is appearing pro se, but does not specify what those adjustments will be. VT. R. EVID.
807(d). The other previously cited statutes (see supra notes 23-33) do not address how to
deal with the pro se defendant at all.
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she has the absolute right to face-to-face confrontation. 218 Such a system may
increase the number of convictions by encouraging defendants to appear pro se,
but it is not designed to protect child witnesses from trauma.
Another section of the statute specifically provides that "[tihis section may
not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a defendant, the
presence of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom at the same
time." 219 This too is a tacit admission by the legislature that in cases in which
identification of the perpetrator is required, the state's interest in protecting the
child witness is not sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's right to
confrontation.
The limited and arbitrary nature of the statute confirms Justice Scalia's
observation that the true purpose of the statue was not to protect child
witnesses, but to increase convictions for the prosecutor-a significant state
interest but not a constitutionally important one.220
2. Research on the Effects upon Children of Testifying Is Not Sufficiently
Advanced to Isolate the Impact of the Presence of the Defendant from
Other Sources of Trauma
In support of her conclusion that the Maryland statutory procedure was
justified by the state's important interest, Justice O'Connor relied in part upon
"the growing body of academic literature documenting the psychological
trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court" 221 which was
cited in the amicus curiae brief filed by the American Psychological
Association (the "APA brief"). 222 Even the academic authorities cited in the
APA brief recognize, however, that "[a]t this point, the empirical literature on
the initial effects of child sexual abuse would have to be considered
sketchy." 223 Research is not at a sufficiently advanced stage to be able to
differentiate the impact of the presence of the defendant upon the child from a
variety of other trauma-inducing aspects of testimony in the courtroom.
Research which has been completed to date suggests that there are a variety
of aspects of testifying which can cause stress for children. The physical
attributes of the courtroom can be overwhelming to the child, from the size of
2 18 Forcing a defendant to choose between two constitutionally protected rights is itself
unconstitutional. See infra discussion accompanying notes 256-58.
219 MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. pROC. § 9-102(d) (1990).
220 The limited and arbitrary nature of the statute also made it subject to attack as
unconstitutionally "underinclusive." See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
221 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3168-69 (1990).
222 Ardcus Curiae Brief for the American Psychological Association at 8, Craig (No.
89-478) [hereinafter APA Brief].223 Angela Brown & David F. Finkelhor, Impact of Odld Sexual Abuse: A Review of
the Research, 99 PSYCHOL. 66, 69 (1986).
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the witness chair to the use of microphones. 224 Repeating their stories many
times has also been reported to be difficult and confusing to children. 225 Other
potentially frightening aspects of participation in a trial include "cross-
examination, the audience, being removed from home, the judge, retaliation or
retribution by the defendant, general fear of the unknown, and the jury."226
Although the APA brief argues that research has shown that testifying in
the presence of the defendant is particularly stressful, the published research it
cites does not support such a conclusion. One of the studies cited involved
pretrial interviews of forty-six children;227 five expressed fear of confronting
the accused. 228 Twenty-two children were observed testifying; only two
demonstrated signs of distress. 229 Another study230 involved interviews of
seventy-five children from eleven county social service departments in central
North Carolina. It concludes that testifying in juvenile court is not traumatizing
for children, but testifying in a protracted criminal trial may have lasting
adverse effects upon the child witness. 231 The factor primarily responsible for
this difference appears to be related to the lengthy delays that are commonplace
in the criminal law system.232 The report cautioned "against extrapolation of
these data to criminal court testimony." 23 3 Lastly, the Goodman Final Report
which Justice O'Connor cites does not support the conclusion that testifying in
the presence of the defendant causes trauma; it shows similar frequencies for
fear of testifying in court and fear of seeing the defendant in court. "This data
does not permit separating out which causes which." 234 In fact, the APA Brief
itself recognizes that one of the strongest predictors of child witness distress is
having to testify many times, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the
presence of the defendant and which the Maryland procedure does nothing to
ameliorate. 235
224 WHrTCOMiB, supra note 34, at 18.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 ROBERT FiN, Er AL., THE CHILD WrrNESS (1988), cited in APA Brief at 12,
Craig (No. 89-478).
228 Am/cue Curiae Brief for Institute for Psychological Therapies at 11, Craig (No. 89-
478) [hereinafter IPT Brief].
229 Id.
230 Desmond K. Runyan, et al., Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexually Abused
O(Ildren, I. PEDIATRIcs 647 (1988).
231 Id. at 652; see also APA Brief at 9, Craig (No. 89-478).
232 Runyan, supra note 230, at 652.
233 Id.
234 IPT Brief at 12, Craig (No. 89-478).
235 APA Brief at 12-13, Craig (No. 89-478).
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3. The Reliability of the Testimony Was Not "Otherwise Assured"
Justice O'Connor concluded that the "reliability of the testimony was
otherwise assured" because the Maryland procedure provided for the oath,
contemporaneous cross-examination, and observation by the judge, jury and
defendant of the witnesses' demeanor over the television monitor.23 6 Indeed,
Justice O'Connor asserted that the reliability of the testimony was actually
enhanced because the child would be more likely to be able to testify accurately
with the emotional distress of facing the defendant removed. 23 7 She reached
this conclusion by ignoring the evidence in the record that showed that the
defendant's right to cross-examine had been severely affected by the one-way
closed circuit procedure, and by failing to consider the impact of televised
testimony generally.
"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." 23 8 Except during his own
testimony, the defendant has a "right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for
advice." 239 While it is true that "the Confrontation Clause only guarantees 'an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish,"2"40
the Maryland procedure seriously diminishes the opportunity for effective
cross-examination.
There was evidence in the record that the defendant's communications with
her lawyer were severely hampered during critical portions of her cross-
236 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166.
237 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3169-70 (citing, inter alia, Ga S. Goodman
& Vicki S. Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault Cildren's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 181 (1985)). Interestingly, however, a subsequent Goodman study appears to
suggest that "there is reason to believe that high levels of stress are associated with better
memory," and concludes:
Our general finding was that stress had a facilitative effect on the children's reports.
Specifically, planned comparisons revealed that children at the highest stress levels
recalled more information than the other children and were less suggestible.
Interestingly, the children had to reach a level of great distress before beneficial effects
on memory were evidenced.
Gail S. Goodman, et al., Cdldren's Concerns and Memory: Issues of Ecological Validity in
the Study of Odildren 's Testimony, in KNOWING AND REMEMBERING IN YOUNG CHILDREN
249, 273 (Fivush & Hudson 1990). See also IPT Brief at 18-19, Craig (No. 89-478).
238 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
239 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (emphasis added). See also Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89 (1976).
240 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987).
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examination.241 Even had the phone system worked perfectly, it is unlikely that
the defendant could have effectively assisted her counsel during the cross-
examination; absent virtually yelling into the phone, there could be no
guarantee that defense counsel could hear the defendant while he questioned the
witness. Hence, the only other person who potentially had actual knowledge of
the events to which the child testified was effectively isolated from her counsel
and precluded from providing valuable input into the cross-examination. Only
by ignoring the record in the case could one easily conclude that the Maryland
procedure safeguarded the defendant's right to cross-examine, thereby insuring
that the reliability of the testimony was "otherwise assured." This argument
was raised by the defendant,2 42 but wholly ignored by the Craig majority.
Justice O'Connor also failed to consider the impact that televised testimony
may have upon the judge's and jury's ability to evaluate the demeanor of the
witness "when the camera, with its obvious limitation, becomes the juror's
eyes and ears." 243 Justice Cardozo once observed that "[i]t is common
knowledge that a camera can be so placed, and lights and shadows so adjusted,
as to give a distorted picture of reality." 244 The Maryland procedure also
insures that the picture that the jury sees will be substantially different than
what they would see if the witness testified in the courtroom because the jury is
unable to see either the prosecutor or the defense attorney. Children are
especially susceptible to the suggestion of others,2 45 and "[t]he nod of approval
or look of consternation from the prosecutor can easily influence the testimony
of a child witness." 246 Finally, "[the child's credibility may also be
subconsciously enhanced by the television as often the media gives an aura of
241 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100, for a description of the difficulties
involved for the defendant in Craig in attempting to communicate with her counsel during
cross-examination of the key witnesses.
2 42 See Respondent's Brief at 29-33, Craig (No. 89-478).
243 Paul W. Ritsema, Note, Testimony of adidren via aosed-arcuit Television in
Indiana: Face (to Television) to Face Confrontation, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 455, 463 (1989).
244 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 115 (1934).
245 See, e.g., People v. Delaney, 199 P. 896, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) ("The force of
suggestion, always strong, is particularly potent with the impressionable and plastic mind of
childhood ...without intending any such result, the repetition of supposed facts in the
presence of a child often creates a mental impression or concept that has no objective reality
in any actually existing fact."); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Graham M. Davies, Distortions in the
Memory of Odidren, 40 J. Soc. IssuEs 51 (1984); Lenore C. Terr, The Cdd Psychiatrist
and the Chld Witness: Traveling Companions by Necessity, if Not by Design, 25 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 462, 469 (1986).
246 Respondent's Brief at 21, Craig (No. 89-478); see also Stephen Landsman,
Refonning Adversay Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the
Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 547, 553 (1984) (suggestibility
especially likely when "the witness has a high regard for the examiner or wants to please
her").
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credibility and authority to those it portrays." 247 While some studies have
suggested that televised testimony (either by television or videotape) has no
markedly negative impact upon effective communication with the jury,248
because child witnesses are in many respects unique and no studies have been
conducted involving child witnesses in criminal trials, 249 the applicability of
such studies to the Maryland procedure is questionable. It is thus doubtful that
the Maryland procedure afforded the jury the functionally equivalent
opportunity to observe the child witness' demeanor as would have occurred if
the child had testified in the courtroom.
D. The Maryland Statute Had Other Constitutional Infirmities That
Were Ignored by the Court
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. 250 There are a plethora of constitutional protections aimed at
implementing this guarantee in addition to those afforded by the Confrontation
Clause. Principal among these are the right to counsel, the right of the
defendant to assist his counsel in every phase of the trial, and the presumption
of innocence. These rights are all designed to afford the criminal defendant
"due process"-the right to a fair trial.
The Maryland procedure as applied in the Craig case affected, or
potentially affected, the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. In addition,
the statute suffered from another constitutional infirmity: it forced an
unconstitutional choice upon the defendant between being represented by
counsel or confronting face-to-face the child witnesses. Wholly apart from the
Confrontation Clause issue, these additional constitutional concerns, some of
which were raised by the defendant but ignored by the Court,25 1 should have
caused the affirmance of the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision.
2 47 Ritsema, supra note 243, at 481.
248 See, e.g., Stephen Miller, The Effects of Videotaped Trial Materials on Juror
Responses, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 205 ( Bermant, et al., eds., 1976); Debra
Whitcomb, Child Victims in Court: the Limits of Innovation, 70 JUDICATURE 90, 91 (1986);
John E. Hocking, et al., Videotape in the Courtroom: Witness Deception, 14 TRIAL 52, 53
(1978); Sherry M. Purdy, Note, Videotaped Testimony in Cdld Sexual Abuse Cases: United
States v. Binder, 23 WILLAMErE L. REV. 193, 203 (1987).
249 Gail S. Goodman et al., When a Child Takes the Stand. Jurors' Perceptions of
Oildren's Eyewitness Testimony, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27-29 (1987) (child
witnesses tend to exhibit many characteristics that lower a witness' perceived credibility).
250 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503 (1976). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
251 See Respondent's Brief at 24-35, Craig (No. 89-478).
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1. The Defendant's Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Was Affected
by the Maryland Procedure
As previously discussed, the defendant's ability to communicate with her
counsel during critical portions of the direct and cross-examinations of the child
witnesses was significantly undercut. 252
This interference with the defendant's ability to assist in her defense
created real prejudice: "[s]he had taught these children, knew them well, and
had special knowledge of each child's intellectual and moral capabilities and
therefore could have greatly assisted her counsel" during their cross-
examination. 253 It must be remembered that pretrial discovery is much more
limited in criminal proceedings than in civil matters.254 The defense often hears
the particulars of the witness' story for the first time at trial. Specific items of
impeachment or information that could be used to reveal contradictions in the
testimony must therefore frequently come from consultation between defendant
and counsel. Defendant's access to her counsel during the child witnesses'
testimony is therefore crucial, particularly when the only persons present
during the alleged crime are the child witness and the defendant.
Any procedure which isolates the defendant from her counsel creates the
opportunity for interference with the right to counsel; the Maryland procedure
virtually assures it.
2. The Maryland Statute Forces an Unconstitutional Choice Between
Exercising the Right to Counsel or the Right to Face-to-Face
Confrontation
The Maryland statute does not apply "if the defendant is an attorney pro
se."255 If the defendant chooses to defend herself without an attorney, the state
can never (at least under this statute) deny her the right to face-to-face
confrontation with all witnesses at trial. Conversely, if the defendant chooses to
avail herself of representation by counsel, she risks losing her right to face-to-
face confrontation because the provisions of the Maryland statute may be
invoked upon the mandated showing. A system which produces such a
Hobbesian choice is not constitutionally countenanced.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a forced choice between two
fundamental constitutional guarantees is untenable. For example, in Simmons v.
2 52 See supra discussion accompanying notes 98-100.
253 Respondent's Brief at 6, Craig (No. 89-478).
254 Compare FED. R. CIlM. P. 16 with FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37. Also recall that the
defendant was denied access to certain exculpatory information to which she was entitled
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) until after trial. See supra note 92.
255 MD. CODE ANN. CTrs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(c) (1990).
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United States25 6 the Court held that the defendant could not be penalized for
the exercise of his Fourth Amendment right to challenge certain evidence
through testimony in support of a motion to suppress by then allowing the
admission of that testimony to establish the defendant's guilt in violation of his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 25 7 The Craig decision
"neglects the serious question" of whether the choice imposed upon the
defendant between her right to be represented by counsel and her right to face-
to-face confrontation "is constitutionally defensible." 25 s
3. The Maryland Procedure Could Adversely Affect the Presumption of
Innocence
The presumption of innocence is, in reality, a constitutional assumption.
Although it is nowhere expressly articulated, it has been recognized as a
fundamental part of the constitutionally mandated right to a fair trial. 25 9 The
core of the presumption is that guilt or innocence is to be determined by the
jury solely on the basis of evidence adduced at trial, and not on "official
suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances" of the trial
process. 260 Not "every practice tending to single out the accused from
everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down," however, because the
defendant's presence at trial to answer the criminal charges may suggest guilt to
some degree.261 When a courtroom practice, procedure, or arrangement gives
rise to the probability of diluting the presumption of innocence, close scrutiny
is required to determine whether there is an unacceptable risk that
impermissible factors may consciously or subconsciously influence the jury's
deliberations. 262 If the actual impact of a specific procedure cannot be precisely
determined, its probable impact must be assessed "based on reason, principle,
and common human experience."263
256 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
257 Id. at 394.
258 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 754 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that majority decision which permitted exclusion of defendant from pre-trial competency
hearing "neglects the serious question whether this choice [between being represented by
counsel and appearing pro se so that he could be present for the pre-trial hearing] is
constitutionally defensible").
259 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-60 (1895).
260 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978); see also In re Wmship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).
261 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986).
262 Id. at 568; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-05 (1976).
263 E.telle, 425 U.S. at 504.
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For example, in Estelle v. Wdliwns264 the Supreme Court has recognized
that compelling a defendant to wear a prison uniform during a jury trial could
erode the presumption of innocence because "the constant reminder of the
accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a
juror's judgment." 265 Courts have similarly acknowledged that appearance by
the defendant before the jury in shackles or other restraints may affect the
presumption of innocence by identifying the defendant as dangerous or
suggesting that his guilt is a foregone conclusion. 266 Conversely, while "a
roomful of uniformed and armed policeman" might undermine a defendant's
ability to get a fair trial, the presence of four state troopers sitting behind the
defendant did not because of the "wider range of inferences that a juror might
reasonably draw from the officers' presence." 267
The use of the Maryland one-way closed circuit television procedure poses
a substantial risk that presumption of innocence will be eroded. All of the
witnesses, save the alleged victims of this heinous crime, appeared to testify in
the courtroom before the judge, the jury and the defendant. When it came time
for the child witnesses to testify, although they were clearly physically nearby,
they testified extensively about the defendant, but not in her presence. The
defendant sat at counsel table, huddled over a phone, virtually yelling
suggestions to her counsel located in chambers. What was the jury to think of
this arrangement? The defendant had been isolated suddenly from the process,
and the jury may well have wondered why. Was it because she posed a danger
to the children? If the children were afraid to testify in her presence, did not
that confirm the truth of their accusations? Her frantic (and sometimes futile)
efforts to communicate with her counsel may well have altered the jury's
perception of the televised testimony.
Admittedly, the use of the one-way closed circuit television system is not
so obviously prejudicial as was the eerily lit screen in Coy. But the procedure
does tend to single out the defendant and is suggestive that she is a danger to
the children and is therefore guilty. In Craig, as far as the record discloses,
there was no instruction to the jury to attempt to ameliorate the potential for
prejudice. While this concern by itself might not have been enough to strike
down the procedure, it contributed, in combination with the other constitutional
concerns which the Maryland procedure raises, to the denial of a fair trial.
264 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
265 Id. at 504-05. In Estelle, however, the defendant failed to object in a timely
fashion to the prison clothes which was "sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion
necessary to establish a constitutional violation." Id. at 512-13.
266 See, e.g., Tyars v. Fimer, 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1983); Harrell v. Israel, 672
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971). But see Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir.
1983).267 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1986).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Craig represents a significant departure from the Supreme Court's prior
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause. To appreciate this, one need only
recognize that for the first time in over two hundred years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, a criminal defendant, who neither waived268 the right to
confrontation nor forfeited it by misbehavior,269 has been denied the right to
face a witness who actually appeared and testified at trial. It is important to
remember that Craig was not a case which required the Court to determine
whether a certain type of hearsay testimony could be admitted into evidence
without violating the Confrontation Clause; both the majority and dissent
assumed that one-way closed circuit testimony was the functional equivalent of
"in court" testimony.270 Instead, the majority concluded that the anticipated
(but unproven) reaction of the child to the mere presence of the defendant,
who, as far as the Constitution was concerned had done nothing more heinous
than be accused of a crime, justified the invocation of a procedure that resulted
in a loss of her right to face-to-face confrontation.
Craig was wrongly decided. The Confrontation Clause does not reflect a
mere "preference" for face-to-face confrontation. The Court's conclusion to the
contrary is obviously the product of what it perceives to be a logical
conundrum created by the fact that the Court has allowed certain forms of
hearsay to be admitted despite the Confrontation Clause's admonition. But the
very limited exceptions explicitly sanctioned by the Court do not warrant the
suspension of face-to-face confrontation of witnesses who actually appear and
testify at trial. To the contrary, the former testimony cases turn on the principle
that face-to-face confrontation, with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine,
268 Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
269 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
270 See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 (1990); Id. at 3174 (Scalia, L,
dissenting); see also Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Ky. 1986); State v.
Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941, 945 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ("this trial technique serves as the
functional equivalent of in-court testimony"); Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 339
(Mo. 1975); People v. Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. 1986)
("It is apparent to this court from a demonstration of the equipment used in this case that
closed circuit television has the capacity to present clear and accurate sounds and images to
the defendant, the witness, the judge, the jury and the public .... [Ilnstantaneous closed-
circuit television can surely satisfy the dictates of the confrontation clause"); Kimberly Seals
Bressler, Comment, Balancing the Right to Confrontation and the Need to Protect Child
Sxual Abuse Victims: Are Statutes Authorizing Televised Testimony Serving Their Pwpose?,
12 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 109, 118 (1988) ("Modem television techniques are capable
of presenting clear and undistorted images, and in some instances, are an improvement over
the view that the jury has of the witness.").
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must occur at some point to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Even if the right
to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, the strict scrutiny test must be
applied before this fundamental right is abrogated. As demonstrated above, the
Maryland statute plainly could not survive such scrutiny. In addition, other
important constitutional rights were affected by the Maryland procedure, the
cumulative effect of which was to deny the defendant her due process right to a
fair trial.
That is not to say that all efforts to lessen the trauma of child witnesses are
constitutionally doomed. Upon an appropriate individualized showing of
necessity, it is possible to address many of the aspects which have been
identified as causing stress for child witnesses by using, for example, a one-
way closed circuit television system to take the child's testimony outside the
intimidating atmosphere of the courtroom, but with the defendant present. The
Iowa statute at issue in Coy provided for such an alternative. Such systems
would still suffer from impairment of the jury's ability to fully judge demeanor,
but the use of wide angle lenses that would broadcast a picture of all of the
participants would lessen such impairment. The use of "two-way" closed
circuit systems, while raising less of a pure confrontation issue, still physically
isolates the defendant from both the witness and defense counsel, raising
concerns for the effective assistance of counsel and the presumption of
innocence.

